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Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-Level Evidence 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1964–2007, we find that conditional 
conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm’s future stock price crashes. This 
finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and it is robust to 
controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm fixed effects. Moreover, we find 
that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher 
information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional 
conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news 
from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk. 
 
JEL classification: G12; M41 
Keywords: conservatism; crash risk; bad news hoarding; asymmetric timeliness 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate managers have incentives to overstate financial performance by strategically 
withholding bad news and accelerating the release of good news, hoping that poor current 
performance will be camouflaged by strong future performance. This asymmetric disclosure 
incentive stems from a variety of factors, including formal compensation contracts and career 
concerns (e.g., Ball 2009; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009). 
If managers withhold and accumulate bad news for an extended period, negative information is 
likely to be stockpiled within a firm. Once the amount of accumulated bad news reaches a certain 
threshold, it will be released all at once, leading to stock price crashes (Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian 2009; Jin and Myers 2006). 
This study investigates the firm-level relation between conditional conservatism in 
financial reporting and stock price crashes. Conditional conservatism refers to accountants’ 
tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to 
recognize bad news as losses (Basu 1997).1 This asymmetric verifiability requirement of 
conservative accounting policy offsets managers’ tendencies to hide bad news and accelerate good 
news recognition in audited financial statements (Watts 2003a; Kothari et al. 2010).2 Moreover, 
conservative audited earnings dampen managerial incentives to disclose unverifiable favorable 
information and, instead, bring forth disclosures of unverifiable unfavorable information (LaFond 
and Watts 2008; Ball, Jayaraman, and Shivakumar 2012). Accordingly, we expect that the more 
conservative a firm’s accounting policy, the lower the probability that firm-specific bad news is 
hidden and accumulated, and thus, the lower likelihood of future stock price crashes. 
 Following prior literature (Chen, Hong, and Stein 2001; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim, Li, and 
                                                      
1 This definition is in contrast to that of unconditional conservatism, which refers to non-news-dependent 
early recognition of expenses and revenue deferrals, such as immediate expensing of R&D expenditures.    
2 In developing the theory of this study, we maintain that conservative accounting policy is chosen by a 
firm’s corporate governance system or imposed by mandatory accounting rules. In Section 5, we provide 
more detailed discussions on the potential endogenous choice of conservatism.   
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Zhang 2011a, b), we proxy for firm-specific crash risk using two measures: (i) the likelihood of 
extreme negative firm-specific weekly returns and (ii) the negative conditional skewness of firm-
specific weekly returns. We measure conditional conservatism using Basu’s (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) accrual-based measure of asymmetric 
timeliness, and Khan and Watts (2009) firm–year measure of conditional conservatism. Using a 
sample of 114,548 firm–years over 1964–2007, we find that the degree of conditional 
conservatism is significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm experiencing 
future stock price crashes. The results are consistent across all three measures of conditional 
conservatism and both measures of crash risk. The results are also robust to controlling for firm 
size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, other firm-specific determinants of crash risk, as well as firm 
fixed effects. Moreover, we find that changes in the degree of conditional conservatism are also 
significantly and negatively associated with changes in future crash risk. 
 Further, we find that the predictive power of conservatism with respect to future crash 
risk is stronger in an environment where investors are faced with higher information asymmetries. 
Specifically, we find that the predictive ability of conservatism is greater for firms with intensive 
research and development (R&D), firms with higher industry concentration, and firms with lower 
levels of analyst coverage. Overall, our evidence is in line with the notion that conditional 
conservatism is an ex ante response to ex post opportunistic behavior to hide firm-specific bad 
news for private gain (Gao 2012; LaFond and Watts 2008; Watts 2003a). 
 This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the conservatism 
literature. Ever since Basu (1997) first provided systematic evidence for the existence of 
accounting conservatism, many studies have examined various country-wide and firm-specific 
factors that explain the demand for conservatism.3 However, existing research pays little attention 
to the economic consequences of or benefits from conservative accounting. Dechow, Ge, and 
                                                      
3 See Watts (2003b) for an excellent structured review of the earlier literature on the existence of alternative 
explanations for conservatism. Ball et al. (2011b) provide an updated list of conservatism studies.      
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Schrand (2010, p.364) argue that “the findings in studies of equity market demand as a 
determinant of asymmetric timeliness imply only that equity market perceive asymmetric 
timeliness as improving earnings quality. They cannot speak to whether equity market should 
demand timely loss recognition”. Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner (2010, p.256) also conclude that 
“the efficiency of conditional conservatism in equilibrium is an empirical question, although its 
survival over many decades and in many contractual settings suggests that it is efficient”. Our 
study is one of the first efforts to provide systematic evidence on the benefit of conservatism in the 
equity market. Our findings on the relation between conservatism and crash risk are particularly 
interesting because crash risk has a devastating impact on investor welfare. 
Second, our results have implications for accounting standard setting bodies. An 
important issue in the debate on accounting standard setting is the extent to which certain 
longstanding attributes of financial reporting, such as conservatism, should be included as part of 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (Kothari et al. 2010). Recently, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
eliminated the conservatism principle from their updated joint conceptual framework. In support 
of the above decision, the IASB and FASB (FASB 2010) claim that conservatism introduces biases 
into financial reporting and increases information asymmetry. Our study, however, shows that 
conditional conservatism is related to less managerial bad news hoarding and lower stock price 
crash risk, increasing investor welfare. 
 Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the relation between accounting 
properties and stock price crashes (e.g., Hutton et al. 2009). It is also related to the literature on the 
relation between accounting and stock market crashes (for a complete review, see Waymire and 
Basu 2011). Barton and Waymire (2004) find that firms with higher accounting quality (including 
conservatism) before October 1929 experienced smaller stock price declines during the market 
crash. Our study extends this literature by examining firm-specific crash risk. 
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and research design. Section 4 presents the main 
empirical results. Section 5 provides robustness checks and additional analyses. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Basu (1997, p.4) defines conservatism as “capturing accountants’ tendency to require a 
higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements”. 
Watts (2003a) attributes the existence and prevalence of conservatism for centuries to the use of 
verifiable accounting numbers in debt and compensation contracts, shareholder litigation, 
regulatory and political processes, and taxation. According to Watts (2003a), conservatism is a 
governance mechanism that constrains managerial incentives and abilities to overstate accounting 
numbers used in a contract. More recently, LaFond and Watts (2008) have focused on equity 
market demand for conservatism. They argue that information asymmetries between corporate 
insiders and outside equity investors engender conservatism in financial reporting. This is because 
conservatism reduces information asymmetry by curbing managers’ incentives, opportunities, and 
ability to overstate income and net asset values. LaFond and Watts provide empirical evidence 
consistent with their argument by showing that bid-ask spreads reduce after increases in 
conservatism.4 This study aims to complement the line of research on the informational role of 
conservatism in the equity market by examining the firm-level relation between conservatism and 
stock price crash risk. 
 Managers can strategically withhold bad news or delay the disclosure of bad news and 
accelerate the release of good news. This behavior stems from a variety of managerial incentives, 
                                                      
4 Several recent studies examine the economic consequences of conservatism in the context of the debt 
market (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002; Ball et al. 2008; Beatty et al. 2008; Li 2011; Nikolaev 2010; Wittenberg-
Moerman 2008; Zhang 2008). 
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such as earnings- or equity-based compensation contracts, career and reputation concerns, and 
empire building (Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003; Ball 2009). Empirically, Kothari et al. (2009) 
provide evidence suggesting that managers tend to delay the release of bad news to outside 
investors. The managerial tendency to conceal bad news from outside investors engenders crash 
risk, or, more generally, negative return skewness (McNichols 1989). This is because the 
asymmetric disclosure behavior of managers leads to stockpiling within a firm of negative 
information unknown to outside investors. When the accumulated bad news reaches a certain 
tipping point or when the managerial incentive for hiding bad news collapses, the large amount of 
negative information will suddenly and immediately be released to the market, leading to an 
abrupt decline in stock price or a crash (Hutton et al. 2009). Moreover, the hiding of bad news 
allows firms with aggressive accounting to keep bad projects for a longer period, compared to 
firms with conservative accounting (Ahmed and Duellman 2011; Francis and Martin 2010). When 
the accumulated bad performance eventually surfaces, one observes stock price crashes 
(Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi 2010 2010; Bleck and Liu 2007). 
 This study predicts that accounting conservatism reduces crash risk for the following 
reasons. First, the asymmetric verifiability requirement for the recognition of losses versus gains 
accelerates the recognition of bad news as losses while delaying the recognition of unverifiable 
good news as gains in audited financial statements. Conservatism thus offsets the managerial 
tendency to hide bad news from outside investors and accelerate the release of good news to the 
market (LaFond and Watts 2008). As a result, bad news flows into the market more quickly than 
unverifiable good news. Conservatism prevents bad news from being stockpiled, and thus reduces 
the likelihood that a large amount of bad news will be released to the market at once. As a result, 
the higher the level of conservatism, the lower the probability that bad news will be hidden and 
accumulate, and thus the lower the crash risk. 
Second, by their nature, conservative accounting reports provide verifiable, “hard” 
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information that can be used as a benchmark for evaluating the credibility of competing, 
alternative sources of unverifiable, “soft” information, such as management forecasts and other 
voluntary disclosures of nonfinancial information (LaFond and Watts 2008). The availability of 
this hard information can discipline managers’ voluntary disclosures through ex post 
accountability for their own voluntary disclosures (Ball 2001; Ball, Jayaraman, and Shivakumar 
2012). Moreover, any reticence (with respect to bad news) or puffery (with respect to good news) 
in voluntary disclosures will be discovered sooner in conservative firms than in non-conservative 
firms. For non-conservative firms, the misleading voluntary disclosures are unlikely to be 
discovered until the manager has moved on, and hence this manager is more likely to mislead 
outside investors through voluntary disclosures. For conservative firms, misleading voluntary 
disclosures are likely to be discovered sooner, so their managers are less likely to mislead outside 
investors through voluntary disclosures. Thus, conservatism constrains the incentives and ability 
of managers to delay the release of bad news and accelerates the release of good news in voluntary 
disclosures. This reduces crash risk, as well as the likelihood of inflating stock price bubbles, an 
important source of crash risk. 
Third, while the above discussion focuses on how conservatism reduces crash risk 
through improving the flow of both hard and soft information to the market, conservatism can also 
reduce crash risk via its impact on real decision making. The timelier recognition of losses than 
gains can be an early warning mechanism that enables shareholders and board of directors to 
promptly identify unprofitable projects and force managers to discontinue them (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005). This prevents the bad performance of bad projects from accumulating and 
reduces the probability of asset price crashes (Ball 2001; Bleck and Liu 2007). For example, 
Francis and Martin (2010) find that conservative firms act more quickly to divest unprofitable 
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acquired companies.5 The above discussions lead to the following hypothesis in alternative form: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The degree of conditional conservatism is negatively related to the 
likelihood of future crash occurrence, ceteris paribus. 
 
Although the crash risk models, such as that of Jin and Myers (2006), are built on the 
concept of bad news hoarding, managers can also hide bad performance by recognizing 
unverifiable good news in accounting income or disclosing them through other channels. For 
example, Enron launched EnronOnline in 1999 and adopted mark-to-market accounting to report 
its performance. Enron’s managers were able to hide the firm’s real losses by recognizing 
anticipated future profits from any deal of EnronOnline as if real today (Benston and Hartgraves 
2002; Benston 2006). We discuss this example to emphasize the importance of our adopting the 
asymmetric verifiability version of conservatism, which includes both the concept of timely loss 
recognition and the postponing of good news recognition until the profit is verifiable. 
Moreover, a key point underlying Hypothesis 1 is that conservatism curbs managerial 
incentives to hide private negative information. However, the amount of value-relevant, private 
information can vary across firms. In the extreme case of no information asymmetry, managers 
have no incentive for strategic disclosure, and thus conservatism plays no role in controlling 
managerial disclosure behavior. On the other hand, if the amount of private information that a 
manager can possibly hide is inherently higher, such as in firms with more R&D investment, the 
disciplinary role of conditional conservatism is likely to be more important. Thus we argue that in 
an environment of high information asymmetry, conservatism plays a more important role in 
countering managerial incentive to withhold negative information and has a stronger impact on 
crash risk. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
                                                      
5 Ahmed and Duellman (2011), Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2011) and Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) 
make similar points. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2. The relation between conditional conservatism and future crash risk is 
more pronounced for firms with high information asymmetry than for firms with 
low information asymmetry, ceteris paribus. 
 
Our main hypotheses are based on the notion that conservative accounting limits the 
incentive and ability of managers to withhold and accumulate adverse private information from 
outside investors, which, in turn, leads to lower future crash likelihood for conservative firms. One 
can argue, however, that outside investors can gain access to adverse private information in a 
timely manner via private information search activities, which, in turn, reduces the likelihood of 
future crashes for non-conservative firms. In other words, to the extent that private information 
search is not prohibitively costly, it can substitute for conservatism. In such a case, there would be 
little difference in future crash likelihoods between conservative and non-conservative firms. 
However, Aboody and Lev (2000), among others, argue that private information search is costly 
and optimal information acquisition by outsiders generally does not exhaust a manager’s private 
information. We therefore expect that the impact of conservatism on future crash risk is important 
even when market participants search actively for private information. 
 
3. Sample and Measurement of Key Variables 
 
Sample and data 
 Initially, our sample is drawn from the intersection of data from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat for the period 1962–2007. We then impose the 
following selection criteria: First, similar to Khan and Watts (2009), we require that total assets 
and book values of equity for each firm be greater than zero and that the share price at the fiscal 
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year-end be greater than $1.6 Second, to be included in the sample, a firm must have at least 26 
weekly returns for each fiscal year. Third, following Khan and Watts (2009), we exclude firms in 
each sample year that fall in the top and bottom percentiles of earnings, annual returns, market 
value of equity, market-to-book ratio, or leverage.7 We delete firm–years with missing data for the 
research variables used in our regressions. After applying these selection criteria, we obtain a full 
sample of 114,548 firm–years spanning the period 1964–2007.8 
 
Measurement of conditional conservatism 
For our empirical tests, we use three measures of conditional conservatism. Our first 
measure of conditional conservatism is Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness coefficient. Specially, 
Basu (1997) estimates the following piecewise linear regression: 
tjjttjtjtjtj RDRDX ,,4,3,21, *   ,              (1) 
where j indexes firm and t indexes year, X is net income scaled by lagged market value of equity, 
R is the compound returns over the 12-month period ending at the fiscal year end, D is a dummy 
equal one if the return is negative, and zero otherwise.9 The Basu coefficient, that is 4 , measures 
the incremental timeliness of earnings in recognizing bad news relative to good news. Larger Basu 
coefficient indicates higher degree of conditional conservatism. 
Our second measure of conditional conservatism is Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005, 2006, 
2008) non-return based measure of asymmetric timeliness.10 Specifically, Ball and Shivakumar 
estimate the following piecewise linear regression: 
                                                      
6 We exclude observations with negative book value following the treatment of most prior research. 
However, our results are very similar if we do not exclude these observations. 
7 All the empirical results remain identical if we do not trim data. 
8 We stop our sample in 2007 because we need to run predictive regressions. In addition, we want to avoid 
the undue influence of the recent financial crisis.  
9 The results are qualitatively similar if we use earnings before extraordinary items and market-adjusted 
returns in the Basu regressions.    
10 For this measure, we exclude firms from financial and utility industries because the nature of accruals of 
these industries is different from that of other industries. 
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jttjtjtjtjtjtjtj CFDCFCFDCFGPPEREVTCA   ,,5,4,3,2,10, * ,              (2) 
where j indexes firm and t indexes year, TCA is current accruals scaled by average total assets, 
∆REV is change in revenue scaled by average total assets, GPPE is gross property, plant, and 
equipment scaled by average total assets, CF is the industry median-adjusted operating cash flow 
scaled by average total assets, and DCF is a dummy variable equal to one if CF is negative, and 
zero otherwise. The coefficient on DCF*CF measures the incremental timeliness of accruals in 
recognizing negative cash flow news relative to positive cash flow news. Larger coefficient on 
DCF*CF indicates higher degree of conditional conservatism. 
 Our third measure of conditional conservatism is Khan and Watts’ (2009) firm–year 
conservatism measure, CSCORE. The estimation of CSCORE begins with the Basu (1997) model. 
Specifically, the Basu model can be written to allow coefficients to vary across firms and over 
time as follows: 
jtjtjtjtjtjtjtttjt RDRDX   *4321 .              (3) 
Then, the firm–year-specific coefficients jt3  (timeliness of good news) and jt4  (conditional 
conservatism) are expressed as linear functions of firm–year-specific characteristics that are 
correlated with the timeliness of good news and conservatism: 
jttjttjtttjt LEVMBMKVGSCORE 43213   ,                                     (4) 
jttjttjtttjt LEVMBMKVCSCORE 43214   ,                   (5) 
where MKV is the natural log of the market value, MB is the market to book equity ratio, and LEV 
is the debt-to-equity ratio, all of which are measured at the beginning of the year. Replacing jt3  
and jt4  in Eq. (3) by Eqs. (4) and (5), respectively, yields the following empirical model: 
.)(
)(*
)(
654321
4321
432121
jtjttjttjttttt
jttjttjtttjtjt
jttjttjtttjtjtttjt
LEVDMBDMKVDLEVMBMKV
LEVMBMKVRD
LEVMBMKVRDX






                    (6)
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We then estimate Eq. (6) using five-year rolling panel regressions11 and calculate our third 
measure of conservatism, CSCORE, using Eq. (5) with the estimated coefficients t1 , t2 , t3 , 
and t4  from Eq. (6). Here, firms with a higher CSCORE are considered more conservative. Khan 
and Watts (2009) conduct a series of tests on the properties of this conservatism measure and 
conclude that the CSCORE measure captures variations in conditional conservatism very well.  
The estimation of Basu (1997) coefficient requires the market to be efficient with respect 
to publicly available information. Our study hypothesizes that for conservative firms the higher 
levels of monitoring and better governance reduce the amount of private information withheld by 
managers. This hypothesis, based on hidden private information, allows the use of the Basu model, 
since Basu does not require the market to be efficient with respect to private information. The 
model simply requires that there be information in returns earlier than in earnings (i.e., there exist 
other information sources). Basu uses publicly available news as a benchmark to capture the 
asymmetric timeliness of a firm’s earnings in reflecting bad news versus good news. The observed 
asymmetric timeliness implies the differential verification standards required for bad news 
recognition versus good news recognition by the firm’s accounting policy. As a maintained 
assumption of most conditional conservatism research, the accounting policy’s differential 
verification standards, although inferred from publicly available information, have disciplinary 
effects on managers’ privately observed information (Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang 2007; Gao 2012; 
LaFond and Watts 2008).12 
 
Measurement of firm-specific crash risk 
 Following Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a,b), we define crash weeks (extreme 
                                                      
11 Therefore, our CSCORE is the PC_SCORE, as in Khan and Watts (2009). We use this specification 
because Khan and Watts report that this measure of conservatism performs best in their “horse racing tests.” 
However, our results are robust to the use of Khan and Watts’ C_SCORE. 
12 For example, Basu (1997, Table 4) specifically tests the impact of conservatism on managers’ privately 
observed information. See also DeFond and Park (2001) for similar tests. 
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events) in a given fiscal firm-year as those weeks during which the firm experiences firm-specific 
weekly returns 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the entire 
fiscal year,13 with 3.2 chosen to generate a frequency of 0.1 percent in the Normal distribution. 14 
The firm-specific weekly return, denoted by W, is defined as the natural log of one plus the 
residual return from the following expanded market model regression: 
  jmjmjmjmjmjjj rrrrrr   2,51,4,31,22,1, ,                    (7) 
where ,jr  is the return on stock j in week   and ,mr  is the return on the CRSP value-weighted 
market index in week  . We include the lead and lag terms for the market index return to allow 
for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson 1979; Scholes and Williams 1977).15 Specifically, the firm-
specific weekly return for firm j in week   is )1ln( .,   jjW  . Our first measure of crash 
likelihood for each firm in each year, denoted by CRASH, is an indicator variable that equals one 
for a firm–year that experiences one or more crash weeks (as defined above) during the fiscal year 
period, and zero otherwise. 
 Following Chen et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2011a,b), our second measure of crash 
likelihood is the negative conditional return skewness (NCSKEW) measure. Specifically, we 
calculate NCSKEW for a given firm in a fiscal year by taking the negative of the third moment of 
firm-specific weekly returns during the same fiscal year, and dividing it by the standard deviation 
of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. Specifically, for each firm j in year t, we 
obtain NCSKEW as 
                                                      
13 Our crash risk measures are estimated over the 12-month period ending three month after the fiscal year 
end to account for the effect of earnings release. 
14 Returns are certainly not normally distributed (e.g., Mandelbrot 1963). Here, we simply use this criterion 
from normal distribution as a convenient way to define extreme returns. Our definition of crash results in 
substantial negative weekly returns. Untabulated statistics show that the mean (median) firm-specific return 
for crash weeks is -20.7 percent (-18.6 percent), and the mean (median) raw return is -22.2 percent (-20.0 
percent). All the untabulated results mentioned in this study are available upon request.  
15 The use of market model is standard in this literature. The idea is to screen out market-level crashes. 
However, using factor models, such as Carhart (1997) four-factor model, to derive firm-specific returns does 
not change the results. 
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    .)2)(1()1( 232323    jjjt WnnWnnNCSKEW                       (8) 
 We introduce this second measure of crash risk for two major reasons. First, one may 
suspect that less conservative firms are, in general, related to longer tails; that is, they have not 
only more crashes but also more positive jumps. The use of negative skewness as an alternative 
measure mitigates this concern (e.g., Kim et al. 2011a, b).16 Second, some option and asset pricing 
applications require future return skewness as an input. Building a model that predicts skewness 
could thus contribute to this line of research. 
 
Control variables 
To isolate the effect of conservatism on crash risk from the effects of other variables, we 
include several control variables known to influence crash likelihood. Our main control variables 
are those used in Chen et al. (2001), that is, detrended share turnover (DTURNt), negative 
skewness of firm-specific weekly returns (NCSKEWt), standard deviations of firm-specific weekly 
returns (SIGMAt), firm-specific average weekly returns (RETt), and firm size (SIZEt). We control 
for the detrended share turnover in year t because Chen et al. show that it proxies for differences 
of opinion among investors and has a significant positive impact on negative return skewness or 
crash risk in year t + 1. Firms with high return skewness in year t are likely to have high return 
skewness in year t + 1 as well (Chen et al. 2001). We control for weekly return volatility (SIGMAt) 
because stocks with high return volatility in year t are more likely to experience crashes in year t + 
1. Chen et al. (2001) provide evidence that past returns have predictive power with respect to 
future crash risk. In particular, the authors find that future crash risk is higher for stocks with 
higher past returns. We therefore control for past one-year average weekly returns (RETt). To 
                                                      
16 To further address this concern, we also construct a variable COUNT, which is the difference between the 
frequency of extreme negative returns and the frequency of extreme positive returns (Jin and Myers 2006). 
We then rerun all regressions by replacing NCSKEW with COUNT. Though not reported, we find that all the 
regression results reported in the paper are qualitatively similar to those using this alternative dependent 
variable. 
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control for the size effect, we include firm size (SIZEt) measured by the natural log of total assets 
rather than the natural log of market capitalization, because the latter is one of three major inputs 
for computing our CSCORE measure. We also include the market-to-book ratio (MBt), financial 
leverage (LEVt), and future operating performance (ROAt+1) as additional control variables.17 
Finally, we estimate alternative regression specifications where the information opaqueness 
measure (OPAQUEt) of Hutton et al. (2009) is additionally included as a control to ensure that our 
conservatism measure has incremental predictive power for crash risk over and beyond OPAQUEt. 
Following Hutton et al. (2009), we measure OPAQUEt as the prior three years’ moving sum of the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated by the 
modified Jones model.18 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the major variables discussed in Section 3, along 
with additional variables that are used as control variables in our multivariate analysis. The mean 
value of CRASH is 0.12, suggesting that, on average, 12 percent of firm–years experience one or 
more firm-specific weekly returns that fall more than 3.2 standard deviations below the annual 
mean. Though not tabulated, a closer look at the data reveals that less than 0.2 percent of firm–
years experience two crash events during a sample year, and only one firm–year experiences more 
than two crash events (three) during a sample year. The mean and median values of NCSKEW 
are -0.20 and -0.19, respectively. Here, NCSKEW is slightly lower than the values reported by 
                                                      
17 The results using CSCORE measure may suffer from multicollinearity problems when including MB and 
LEV as controls, since these two variables are also used to construct CSCORE. However, untabulated tests 
show that the results are very similar if we exclude these two control variables. 
18 Since the Hutton et al. (2009) measure requires statement of cash flows data, the sample period for 
specifications with OPAQUE starts from1990. We do not describe the detailed procedures here, since we use 
exactly the same procedure as in Hutton et al. (2009). 
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Chen et al. (2001), which is expected, since these authors use daily returns to construct their 
variables (Fogler and Radcliffe 1974). The mean and median values of CSCORE are 0.15 and 
0.15, respectively, which are slightly larger than those reported by Khan and Watts (2009).19 
[Insert TABLE 1 Here] 
Table 2 presents the Pearson/Spearman correlation matrix for all the variables used in our 
regression analysis. The two measures for crash risk, CRASH and NCSKEW, are significantly and 
positively correlated with each other. The year t conservatism measure, CSCOREt, is significantly 
and negatively correlated with the two measures of year t + 1 crash risk, which is consistent with 
our prediction that more conservative firms have lower crash risk. The first and second moments 
of returns (i.e., RET and SIGMA) are highly correlated, which is expected.20  
[Insert TABLE 2 Here] 
 
Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
Basu piece-wise linear regression 
 To test whether more conservative firms experience lower crash risk, we first estimate the 
following augmented Basu (1997) model following the method of Francis and Martin (2010):  
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(9) 
where the dependent variable Xt is earnings in year t scaled by lagged market value and all 
                                                      
19 Khan and Watts (2009) report mean (median) CSCORE of 0.10 (0.10). This is partially caused by our using 
of beginning of the year MKV, LEV, and MB in estimating the augmented Basu regression to eliminate 
reverse causation. Khan and Watts (2009) use ending balances of these variables. We thank Sudipta Basu for 
the suggestion of using beginning of the year values. 
20 In later regression analyses (Table 5), we find that the VIFs of both SIGMA and RET are around 15, 
suggesting some multicollinearity problems. However, our main results are unchanged if we drop one of 
these two control variables. The VIFs of all other independent variables are below 2.The rule of thumb is that 
there is a multicollinearity problem if VIF > 10. 
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independent variables are defined previously. ControlVar represent the set of control variables 
defined in Section 3 excluding ROA.21 Note that X, D, and R are measured in year t, while CRASH 
is measured in year t + 1. The control variables are all measured at the beginning of year t. A 
negative coefficient on jtjtt RDCRASH **1  is consistent with our prediction that accounting 
conservatism is negatively associated with future crash risk (i.e., β8 < 0). We also replace 
CRASHt+1 with NCSKEWt+1 in Eq. (9) to examine the relation between conservatism and negative 
firm-specific return skewness. 
Several recent studies criticize the validity of the Basu (1997) model in capturing 
conditional conservatism and claim that the Basu coefficient is biased (e.g., Dietrich et al. 2007; 
Givoly et al. 2007; Patatoukas and Thomas 2011). However, proponents of Basu model reject 
those criticisms based on both analytical and empirical evidence (e.g., Ryan 2006; Basu 2009; Ball 
et al. 2011, 2012b). Specifically, Ball et al. (2012b) suggest that the inclusion of firm fixed effects 
can eliminate the biases documented by Patatoukas and Thomas (2011).22 Accordingly, we use 
firm-fixed-effect models to estimate Eq. (9). For comparison, we also report OLS regression 
results without firm fixed effects.23 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating Eq. (9). To address potential cross-sectional and 
serial dependence in the data, we report t-values (in parentheses) that are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering (Petersen 2009). Panel A of Table 3 presents the results 
with CRASHt+1 as the measure of future crash risk. Model (1) reports the results of estimating Eq. 
(9) with firm fixed effects but without additional firm-level control variables. The coefficient on 
the interaction term Dt*Rt is 0.048 and is significant at the 1percent level (t = 4.91), suggesting 
                                                      
21 We exclude ROA from this regression because the dependent variable in Eq. (9) is earnings scaled by 
market value. 
22 Patatoukas and Thomas (PT, 2011) attribute the biases to scaled-related effects. However, Ball et al. 
(2012b) show that PT biases is essentially due to correlate omitted variables. See both PT and Ball et al. 
(2012b) for more discussions on this issue. 
23 Ball et al. (2012b) argue that controlling for firm characteristics (risk factors) can also help reduce the 
biases. Thus, our OLS regression results with firm-level control variables are also reliable. 
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that our sample firms on average recognize economic losses more quickly than economic gains. 
The coefficient on CRASHt+1*Dt*Rt is -0.038 and is statistically significant at the 1percent level (t 
= -2.70), which is consistent with our prediction that the degree of conditional conservatism is 
negatively associated with future crash risk. Model (2) reports the results of estimating Eq. (9) 
with firm fixed effects and all other control variables except OPAQUE.24 The impact of 
conservatism on future crash risk continues to be significantly negative (the coefficient on 
CRASHt+1*Dt*Rt = -0.028, t = -1.98), even after controlling for firm size, market-to-book, 
leverage, and other firm characteristics that impact crash risk. The adjusted R2 increases from 8.66 
percent in model (1) to 11.44 percent  in model (2). Following Francis and Martin (2010), we 
assess the economic significance of the impact of conservatism on crash risk using a bootstrapping 
method. Specifically, we first estimate Eq. (1) 500 times based on randomly selected samples with 
observations equal to ten percent of the full sample. The mean and standard deviation of the Basu 
coefficient from this process is 0.145 and 0.013, respectively. Thus, a one standard deviation 
increase in the Basu coefficient leads to a decrease in crash probability by a magnitude of 46.4 
percent (100*0.013/0.028) based on the results of model (2) in Panel A, which is economically 
significant. 
Model (3) re-estimates the specification of model (2) by OLS regression without firm 
fixed effects. The results continue to hold. The adjusted R2 in model (3) is 14.97 percent, which is 
larger than the 11.44 percent R2 of model (2). This suggests that Eq. (9) is more useful in 
explaining cross-sectional variations than within firm time-series variations. Models (4) to (6) 
estimate Eq. (9) using a reduced sample from 1990 to 2007 with non-missing values for OPAQUE. 
The impact of conservatism on future crash risk continues to be significantly negative for this 
reduced sample, irrespective of whether we control for earnings management (i.e., OPAQUE) or 
not. 
                                                      
24 The Hutton et al. OPAQUE measure is only available from 1990 onwards. In this study, we present the 
regression results for specifications with and without OPAQUE. 
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Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of estimating Eq. (9) using NCSKEW as the 
measure of crash risk. In all specifications, the impact of conservatism on future negative 
skewness, as captured by the coefficient on NCSKEWt+1*Dt*Rt, is negative. The results are also 
statistically significant except those in models (4) and (5). This is likely due to the reduced power 
of the model when estimating within firm effects using a shorter time series. As seen in Panel B, 
model (6), the impact of conservatism on future negative skewness is significantly negative even 
for the shorter time series from 1990 to 2007 when we draw power from cross-sectional variations 
using pooled OLS regression. The adjusted R2 in model (6) is also significantly larger than those 
of models (4) and (5). Overall, the results in Table 3 show that conditional conservatism as 
measured by the Basu coefficient has a significant and negative impact on future stock price crash 
risk, supporting Hypothesis 1.25 
[Insert TABLE 3 Here] 
 
Ball and Shivakumar piece-wise linear regression 
 Our second set of tests use the Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006, 2008) accrual-based 
measure of asymmetric timeliness to examine the impact of conditional conservatism on future 
crash risk. Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
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where the dependent variable TCAt is total current accruals in year t scaled by average total assets 
and all independent variables are defined previously. ControlVar represent the set of control 
variables defined in Section 3 excluding ROA. A negative coefficient on CRASHt+1*DCFt*CFt is 
consistent with our prediction that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with future 
                                                      
25 Due to severe multicollinearity problems, we do not discuss the coefficients on control variables in the 
Basu and Ball-Shivakumar regressions. Note, however, that the VIFs of CRASH/NCSKEW and the interaction 
terms with CRASH/NCSKEW are all below 2. 
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crash risk (i.e., β9 < 0). Similar to the Basu regression tests, we also replace CRASHt+1 with 
NCSKEWt+1 in Eq. (10) to examine the relation between conservatism and negative firm-specific 
return skewness. 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Eq. (10). Since the model specifications of Table 
4 are largely the same as in Table 3 except for the difference in conservatism measurement, we do 
not discuss the results in Table 4 in detail to save space. Overall, we can see from Table 4 that the 
impact of conditional conservatism on future crash risk, as captured by the coefficients on 
CRASHt+1*DCFt*CFt/ NCSKEWt+1*DCFt*CFt, is negative and significant at less than the 5 
percent level across all model specifications. One thing worth mentioning is the results of models 
(4) and (5) in Panel B. The impact of conservatism on future negative return skewness in the Ball-
Shivakumar firm-fixed-effect specification is significant with a negative sign even for the shorter 
time-series from 1990 to 2007, while the same impact in the Basu firm-fixed-effect specification is 
insignificant, as reported in models (4) and (5) in Panel B of Table 3. 
[Insert TABLE 4 Here] 
 
Khan and Watts (2009) firm-year conservatism measure 
Our third set of tests for Hypothesis 1 estimate the following regression (firm subscripts 
are suppressed): 
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            (11) 
where CRASHt+1 is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences one or more crash 
events in year t + 1, and zero otherwise, and CSCOREt refers to the Khan and Watts (2009) 
conservatism measure in year t. ControlVar represents the set of control variables defined in 
Section 3. Hypothesis 1 predicts that 01  . 
Table 5, Panel A, reports the logistic regression results for Eq. (11). All regressions in 
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Table 5 also include year dummies to control for temporary economic shocks to crash risk. Model 
(1) presents the results of our baseline regressions of CRASHt+1 on our control variables, namely, 
DTURNt, NCSKEWt, SIGMAt, RETt, SIZEt, MBt, LEVt, and ROAt+1. Note that these control 
variables represent the combined set of crash determinants examined by Chen et al. (2001) and 
Hutton et al. (2009). Model (1) shows that the coefficient on DTURNt is significantly positive. In 
Chen et al. (2001), this detrended share turnover variable is the key test variable that proxies for 
investor belief heterogeneity or differences of opinion among investors. Chen et al. (2001) 
examine the effect of DTURNt on negative return skewness, but not its effect on extreme 
outcomes, namely, crash probability (CRASH). Our results therefore provide corroborating 
evidence for the theory of Chen et al. that investor heterogeneity increases crash risk. The 
coefficient on past skewness (NCSKEWt) is significantly positive, consistent with Chen et al. 
(2001).  The coefficient on past return volatility (SIGMAt) is positive but insignificant. Consistent 
with Chen et al. (2001), model (1) shows that the coefficients on past stock returns (RETt) and 
market-to-book ratio (MBt) are significantly positive, which is consistent with the “stochastic 
bubble theory,” that stocks with high past returns and growth stocks are more crash prone (Harvey 
and Siddique, 2000). The coefficient on firm size is not significant, inconsistent with Chen et al. 
(2001). However, the coefficient on firm size is significantly positive when we use Chen et al.’s 
(2001) NCSKEWt+1 to measure crash risk (as shown in Panel C of Table 5).26 Finally, the 
coefficient on LEVt is significantly negative and the coefficient on ROAt+1 is negative but not 
significant. 
Model (2) presents the results of adding CSCOREt to the baseline regression specification 
in model (1). The coefficient on CSCOREt, is highly significant, with an expected negative sign 
and t = -4.21, suggesting that conservatism in year t is negatively related to crash risk in year t + 1, 
                                                      
26 The coefficient on firm size is positive and insignificant if we replace total assets with market value (0.022, 
t = 1.38). We use total assets in the regression model to minimize the multicollinearity problem because 
market value is used to construct CSCORE. As expected, the coefficient on CSCORE is less significant when 
we replace total assets with market value in Model 2 (-1.075, t = 2.49).  
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even after controlling for other determinants of crash risk. In models (3) and (4), the coefficients 
on CSCOREt continue to be significantly negative for the period 1990 to 2007, irrespective of 
whether controlling for OPAQUEt or not. In addition, the coefficient on the opaqueness measure 
(OPAQUEt) of Hutton et al. (2009) is significantly positive, with t = 2.62. To assess the economic 
significance of our test results, using the coefficients of model (4) in Panel A, we compute the 
marginal effect of CSCORE and other control variables (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, 2004). Panel 
B presents the marginal effect analysis for the results of model (4). The marginal effect of 
CSCORE(-1.23 percent) in model (4) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in CSCORE 
results in a 1.23 percentage point decrease in the probability of a crash. This effect represents 
about a 10 percent decrease in crash risk (0.012/0.12). The marginal effect of CSCORE is about 
twice as much the magnitudes of those of DTURN (0.007) and OPAQUE (0.006). 
To uncover further evidence on the relation between conservatism and crash risk, we also 
use the negative conditional skewness (NCSKEW) of the weekly firm-specific return distribution 
(Chen et al., 2001) as an alternative proxy for future crash risk. Table 5, Panel C, reports the 
results of OLS regressions using NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable. As shown in Panel C of 
Table 5, the coefficients of CSCOREt are significantly negative at less than the 1 percent level 
across all models, which strongly supports the prediction in Hypothesis 1. This result is 
economically significant as well. Consider the results in model (4) as an example. The CSCORE 
coefficient of -0.571 indicates that a one standard deviation increase in CSCOREt leads to an 
approximately 24 percent (= 0.571*0.085/0.200) decrease in NCSKEWt+1. 
We also evaluate the usefulness of CSCORE in improving the explanatory power of the 
crash prediction model using incremental adjusted R2s (Darlington 1968). For this purpose, we 
focus on the OLS regression model, because there are no real R2s for logit models and Pseudo R2s 
are generally not meaningful in evaluating incremental explanatory power. Panel C of Table 5 
shows that the adjusted R2 of model (2) with CSCORE is 6.79 percent and the adjusted R2 of model 
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(1) without CSCORE is 6.22 percent. This result suggests that adding CSCORE to the baseline 
model improves the explanatory power of the model by about 9.2 percent [(6.79-6.22)/6.22]. To 
compare, OPAQUE increases the explanatory power of the crash prediction model by only about 
0.3 percent [(6.11-6.09)/6.09].  
[Insert TABLE 5 Here] 
Overall, the results reported in Tables 3 to 5 reveal that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the 
higher the conservatism in year t, the lower the likelihood of crashes in year t + 1, and this relation 
is robust to different measures of conservatism and crash risk. This result holds after controlling 
for investor heterogeneity (Chen et al. 2001) and information opaqueness (Hutton et al. 2009). Our 
results are consistent with the view that conservatism plays a significant role in limiting 
managerial incentives and ability to withhold or delay the disclosure of bad news, thereby 
lowering the probability of bad news being stockpiled within a firm and thus reducing the 
likelihood of a stock price crash. 
 
Test of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the impact of conservatism on reducing the likelihood of future 
crashes is more pronounced for firms with high information asymmetry than for firms with low 
information asymmetry. To test this hypothesis, we consider four proxies of information 
asymmetry between managers and equity market participants. 
The first measure is the relative amount of R&D investment. Prior literature argues that 
R&D investment is a major source of private information from the investor’s perspective (Aboody 
and Lev 2000). Many R&D projects, such as new drugs or software programs under development, 
are unique to the firms concerned, whereas capital investment projects share common 
characteristics across firms. Therefore, it is difficult for outside investors to infer the productivity 
and value of a firm’s R&D from observing the R&D performance of other firms. In addition, 
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unlike many other physical and financial assets, there is no organized market for R&D and hence 
no asset prices from which to derive valuation implications of firm-specific R&D. Aboody and 
Lev (2000) provide evidence suggesting that R&D is a major contributor to information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders, and thus an important source of insider 
gains. In light of Hypothesis 2, we expect that the impact of conservatism on reducing crash risk is 
more pronounced for more R&D-intensive firms. 
The second measure is the degree of industry concentration or the lack of product market 
competition. Economists argue that product market competition mitigates managerial agency 
problems (Giroud and Mueller 2010). Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Hui et al. (2012) provide 
evidence that intense product market competition induces managers to be more conservative in 
financial reporting. Ali et al. (2012) find that firms in more concentrated industries (with, 
therefore, low competition) have a more opaque information environment. This finding suggests 
that information asymmetries are higher for firms with high industry concentration. Thus we 
expect that the impact of conservatism on reducing crash risk is accentuated for firms with high 
industry concentration or low product market competition. 
 The third measure is analyst coverage. Financial analysts intermediate between managers 
and less-informed outside investors. Furthermore, analysts play a role in monitoring managerial 
disclosure behavior (Ball 2001). Evidence shows that analysts’ information intermediation and/or 
monitoring is value adding because it reduces information asymmetry between corporate insiders 
and outsiders (Lang et al. 2003). Yu (2008) finds that firms with high analyst coverage engage less 
in opportunistic earnings management, a finding consistent with the monitoring role of analysts. 
The above findings, taken together, suggest that information asymmetry in the equity market is 
lower for firms with higher analyst coverage. In light of Hypothesis 2, we expect that the impact 
of conservatism on reducing crash risk is attenuated for firms with high analyst coverage. Finally, 
we construct a comprehensive measure of information asymmetry using principle component 
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analysis. 
 Table 6, Panel A, reports the results from the augmented model of Eq. (11), where 
CRASHt+1 is the dependent variable and three proxies for information asymmetry and their 
interactions with our measure of conservatism, CSCOREt, are added. Panel B of Table 4 reports 
the same results, using NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable. In both Panels A and B, R&Dt is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firms with R&D investment in year t, and zero otherwise; 
HICONt is an indicator variable that equals one if firms have an above-median Herfindahl-
Hirschman index in year t, and zero otherwise; NEGCOVt is the natural log of one plus the number 
of analysts following a firm in year t, multiplied by minus one; and IA_FACTOR is the first 
principle component of the previous three measures. For all four measures, higher values indicate 
higher information asymmetry. In all regressions, we include the same set of control variables, that 
is, DTURNt, NCSKEWt, SIGMAt, RETt, SIZEt, MBt, LEVt, ROAt+1. To save space, we do not report 
the regression coefficients for control variables. 
Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) demonstrate that both the effects and 
standard errors of interaction terms in logit or probit models are biased and suggest a method to 
correct for these biases. Accordingly, we follow their suggestion when estimating the magnitude 
and standard errors of the interaction effect in logit models: In Table 6, Panel A, for non-
interaction terms, we estimate the coefficients and standard errors using the double-clustering 
method, as in Table 5. For interaction terms, we use the procedure of Norton et al. (2004) to 
estimate the marginal effects and standard errors.27 
 The results in both Panels A and B of Table 6 show that the coefficients of 
CSCORE*R&D, CSCORE*HICON, CSCORE*NEGCOV and CSCORE*IA_FACTOR are all 
negative. The estimated coefficients on these interaction terms are also highly significant except 
                                                      
27 We find that our statistical inferences remain the same even when we do not use the procedure 
of Norton et al. (2004). 
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for that of model (3) in Panel A. For example, the marginal effect on the interaction term 
CSCORE*R&D of model (1) in Panel A is 0.9 percent (0.085*0.106), suggesting that a one 
standard deviation increase in CSCORE reduces crash risk by about one percentage point more for 
firms with high information asymmetries than for firms with low information asymmetries. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 are generally consistent with Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the 
impact of conservatism on reducing the likelihood of a crash is more pronounced for firms with 
high information asymmetry. 
[Insert TABLE 6 Here] 
 
5. Additional Tests and Discussions 
 
Endogeneity, fixed-effect regressions, and change analysis 
The cross-sectional variation in the level of conservatism is likely to be endogenously 
determined by the cross-sectional variation in the strength of corporate governance. For example, 
a firm with stronger governance (e.g., more independent board or auditor) may be more likely to 
adopt conservative accounting policies (e.g., Beekes et al. 2004; Basu et al. 2001a; Krishnan 
2003). One possibility is that better governance system uses conservative accounting as a tool to 
constrain managerial bad news hoarding behavior, which in turn reduces crash risk. In this case, 
the implications of our empirical results are not much affected since better governance reduces 
crash risk through the employment of conservatism. However, another possibility is that strong 
governance has a direct impact on crash risk by aligning the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. In this latter case, our results are likely to be driven by the simultaneous impacts of 
governance on both conservatism and crash risk.  
Moreover, managers could choose conservatism to bond against exploiting their 
information advantage (e.g., Basu 1997). In this case, conservatism can be a signal for managerial 
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quality, and managerial quality can have a direct impact on crash risk. In this subsection, in an 
effort to address the above endogeneity problems caused by correlated omitted (unobservable) 
variables at least partially,28 we use firm fixed-effect regression technique (FE). FE regression 
essentially controls for (removes) the effects of any time-invariant individual firm characteristics. 
To the extent that managerial quality or governance remains stable or changes very slowly within 
a firm, FE regression should help us alleviate the concern about the above endogeneity problems 
(Roberts and Whited 2012). In addition, the time-series variation in conservatism is likely to be 
imposed by exogenous forces, such as standard setters, regulators, and the courts. Thus, FE 
technique naturally explores this exogenous variation of conservatism by drawing power largely 
from within-firm variations. In Table 7, we repeat the empirical tests in Table 5 by using FE 
regressions and find that all the previously reported findings hold. The results in Table 7 suggest 
that our previous findings are unlikely to be driven by correlated omitted variables.  
[Insert TABLE 7 Here] 
To further mitigate the above concerns about endogeneity, we also estimate the change 
specification of Eq. (11).29 In addition, change analysis can also reduce spurious regression bias in 
time-series lead-lag tests if our dependent and independent variables are somewhat sticky (e.g., 
Yule 1926; Hendry 1980; Ferson et al. 2003). For example, untabulated tests show that the 
variations in conservatism in year t-1 can explain as much as 70 percent of variations in 
conservatism in year t. Similarly, Chen et al. (2001) and our results in Table 5 show that there is a 
persistent component in negative return skewness. Table 8 reports the results of the change 
analysis. As shown both Panels A and B of the table, we find that the coefficients on ∆CSCORE 
are highly significant with an expected negative sign across all models. This finding buttresses the 
                                                      
28 Managerial quality is largely unobservable. The strength of governance is also difficult to measure if not 
possible. In untabulated tests, we find that our results are robust to the controlling of various governance 
variables (e.g., G-Index). In fact, we find no evidence that corporate governance is related to crash risk. 
29 We use OLS regression to estimate the impact of changes in conservatism on changes in crash event 
occurrence.  
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view that changes in conditional conservatism in year t lead to changes in crash risk in year t+1. 
[Insert TABLE 8 Here] 
Overall, our FE regression and change specification results suggest that it is unlikely that 
our results are driven by the endogeneity of accounting conservatism. Nonetheless, we admit that 
not all potential endogeneity problems can be addressed by the FE technique and change analysis. 
Thus readers should exercise caution in taking our study as establishing an absolute causal relation 
between conservatism and crash risk. 
 
The Cox proportional hazard model approach 
Jin and Myers (2006) argue that time can enter investors’ assessment of crash 
probabilities because these probabilities increase as time passes. To incorporate this time effect, 
we employ the Cox (1972) proportional hazard method:
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where )(th jk  is the “hazard,” or instantaneous likelihood of crash occurrence, for firm j at time t, 
conditional on k crashes having occurred in firm j by time t30; )1( kjt  is the time of the (k - 1)th 
event; and (.)  is an unspecified function that captures the baseline hazard. Hypothesis 1 
translates as 1  < 0, which can be interpreted in such a way that the hazard of crash occurrences 
decreases with conservatism, or the instantaneous likelihood of crash occurrences decreases with 
conservatism, given past crash history. 
To estimate the hazard model in Eq. (12), we identify a sample of firms with at least one 
crash event during the sample period. For each firm crash event, we calculate the crash interval, 
                                                      
30 Specifically, the hazard function 
t
tNttN
th jjtj 
 
]1)()(Pr[
lim)( 0 , where Nj(t) is the number of events 
that have occurred to firm j by time t. 
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which is the length of time (in weeks) from the current firm crash event to the next. If no further 
firm crash event is observed, the interval is the length of time from the current event until the 
firm’s delisting date or the ending date of the sample period, whichever occurs first. The control 
variables are the same as in Eq. (11) and year dummies are included. The model is estimated by 
partial likelihoods using the well-known stratification method (Cox 1975). The partial likelihood 
estimation makes it possible to estimate 1  to m  without specifying a particular functional form 
of (.) . Firm-level stratification allows different firms to have different baseline hazard 
functions, while constraining the coefficients to be the same across firms (Allison 2005). Table 9 
reports the estimated coefficients and Z-values for the stratified hazard model regressions. All 
reported Z-values are adjusted using standard errors corrected for firm and year double clustering. 
[Insert TABLE 9 Here] 
 As shown in Table 9, the coefficients on CSCORE are negative and significant at the 1 
percent level in all models, which supports Hypothesis 1. To assess the economic significance of 
our test variable, consider the results reported in model (2) as an example: The coefficient of 
CSCORE is -3.301, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in CSCORE leads to an 
approximately 24.5 percent (= 1 - e (-3.301×0.085)) reduction of the subsequent crash hazard rate, even 
after controlling for all other determinants of crash occurrence. The interpretation is that the 
instantaneous crash likelihood of conservative firms at time t is lower than that of aggressive 
firms, conditional on k crashes having occurred by time t. Table 9 also shows that the coefficients 
of DTURNt and OPAQUEt  are significantly positive, which lends further support to the findings of 
Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009). 
 
Longer forecast windows 
Our logit and OLS regressions examine the relation between the current year’s 
conservatism and the crash probability in the one-year-ahead forecasting window. It is interesting 
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to further examine how far out our conservatism predicts future crash risk. Toward this end, we 
now expand the measurement window of crash risk into two- and three-year-ahead windows. 
Specifically, we estimate CRASH and NCSKEW using firm-specific weekly returns during the 
two- and three-year periods starting three months after the current fiscal-year end. In so doing, we 
require at least 100 and 150 weekly returns for each firm for the two- and three-year window tests, 
respectively.31 Using the two- or three-year crash risk measure as our dependent variable, we re-
estimate Eq. (11) with the full set of control variables, namely, model (4) of Table 5 and report the 
estimated results in Table 10. To facilitate comparison, we also present the one-year-ahead 
window results and restrict the sample to firm-year observations with non-missing values for all 
specifications.  
[Insert TABLE 10 Here] 
Panel A of Table 10 displays the logistic regression results. As shown in Panel A, the 
coefficients on CSCORE are significantly negative for both model (2) (two-year-ahead forecasting 
window) and model (3) (three-year-ahead forecasting window). Panel B of Table 10 presents the 
results of OLS regressions with NCSKEW as a measure of crash risk. Again, the coefficients of 
CSCORE are significantly negative for both the two- and three-year forecasting windows. The 
above results indicate that the predictive ability of conservatism for future crash risk is robust 
when the measurement window of crash likelihood is extended up to three years ahead. Table 10 
also shows that the predictive power of our model increases with the length of crash measurement 
window. This may suggest that the hidden bad news of less conservative firms is more likely to 
materialize in longer terms and thus bad-news-hoarding driven crashes are more likely to be 
observed in longer windows. 
 
                                                      
31 Note that it is inappropriate to use crash risk measured over year t+2 or t+3 as the dependent variable 
because the construct of interest is rare events (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006). According to the crash theory, the 
occurrence of crash in one year naturally reduces the crash probability in the years immediately after the 
event year. 
30 
 
Trend analysis 
Basu (1997) and subsequent researchers (e.g., Pope and Walker 1999; Givoly and Hayn; 
Holthausen and Watts 2001; Ryan and Zarowin 2003) indicate that conditional conservatism has 
increased considerably over time in the United States. If conditional conservatism reduces crash 
risk, we should observe a decreasing trend in stock price crash risk over time. However, we find 
an overall increasing trend in crash risk. Figure 1 plots the time-series trend of (lagged) 
conditional conservatism and frequency of firm-specific crashes over the period 1965 to 2007. 
Figure 1 shows a clear increasing pattern in the time-series distribution of crash risk, with two 
peaks in 1987 and 2001, respectively. Consistent with prior research, we find a strong increasing 
trend in conservatism from 1967 to 1979.32 The level of conservatism drops significantly in early 
1980s and then increases gradually until 1990. The level of conservatism drops again in the first 
two years of 1990s, and then increases sharply until the mid-1990s. The second half of 1990s sees 
a decreasing trend of conservatism and the early 2000s sees an increasing trend of conservatism. 
Overall, there is an increasing trend in the level of conditional conservatism. 
[Insert FIGURE 1 Here] 
 
Instead of using the pure time-series analysis above, we investigate the time-series 
relation between conservatism and crash risk by a pooled firm-level regression (e.g., Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam 2011). Specifically, we augment Eq. (11) by including a time-trend variable 
(TIME) and its interactions with all other independent variables. This method can increase the 
power of our test and facilitate the controlling of other confounding effects. Table 11 presents the 
results. Models (1) and (2) show that the coefficients on interaction term TIME*CSCORE are 
negative and significant, suggesting that the increasing trend in conservatism contributes 
negatively to the increasing trend in crash risk. Models (3) and (4) re-estimate models (1) and (2) 
                                                      
32 Note that the Basu coefficient is lagged by one year. 
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by taking out year fixed effects. The logit regression with CRASH as the dependent variable 
continues to show a significantly negative coefficient on TIME*CSCORE. However, the same 
coefficient in the OLS regression with NCSKEW as the dependent variable becomes positive. This 
result may suggest that it is important to control for transitory shocks to crash risk.  
[Insert TABLE 11 Here] 
6. Conclusions 
 This study investigates the relation between conditional conservatism in financial 
reporting and future stock price crash risk. Using a large sample of firm–years over the period 
1964–2007, we find that the degree of conditional conservatism (i.e., timelier recognition of bad 
news as losses than of good news as gains) is significantly and negatively associated with future 
crash risk. This result holds after controlling for investor heterogeneity, information opaqueness, 
and other firm-specific factors deemed to cause large negative return outliers. Our results are 
robust to the use of different measures of crash risk and conservatism, alternative model 
specifications, and a variety of sensitivity checks. In addition, we find that the predictive power of 
conservatism with respect to future crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher 
information asymmetry, namely, those with relatively higher R&D investments, higher industry 
concentration, and lower analyst coverage. 
Our results are consistent with the notion that accounting conservatism is associated with 
less withholding of bad news or the more timely release of bad news to outside investors, thereby 
reducing stock price crash risk. LaFond and Watts (2008) provide evidence that conservatism 
plays an important role in the equity market by reducing information asymmetry. Our study 
complements theirs by providing evidence on one benefit of conservatism in the equity market 
through the reduction of future crash risk. Our research has implications for standard setting 
bodies, such as the FASB and IASB, which recently eliminated conservatism from their 
conceptual framework. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics 
       
Variable Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 N 
CRASHt+1 0.122 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 114,548 
NCSKEWt+1 -0.200 0.711 -0.579 -0.185 0.193 114,548 
CSCOREt 0.154 0.085 0.101 0.146 0.190 114,548 
DTURNt 0.002 0.053 -0.010 0.000 0.012 114,548 
NCSKEWt -0.199 0.686 -0.579 -0.192 0.181 114,548 
SIGMAt 0.054 0.026 0.034 0.048 0.067 114,548 
RETt -0.177 0.186 -0.224 -0.113 -0.057 114,548 
SIZEt 5.544 2.005 4.028 5.409 6.934 114,548 
MBt 2.213 2.064 1.017 1.579 2.570 114,548 
LEVt 0.228 0.179 0.069 0.210 0.351 114,548 
ROAt+1 0.035 0.103 0.009 0.042 0.081 114,548 
OPAQUEt 0.317 0.270 0.132 0.233 0.412 46,585 
Xt 0.061 0.130 0.030 0.069 0.112 95,938 
Rt 0.155 0.450 -0.131 0.096 0.357 95,938 
Dt 0.387 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 95,938 
TCA 0.021 0.085 -0.017 0.014 0.056          88,734 
∆REVt 0.140 0.288 0.008 0.109 0.249          88,734 
GPPEt 0.593 0.362 0.320 0.526 0.810          88,734 
CFt 0.016 0.123 -0.033 0.020 0.077          88,734 
DCFt 0.393 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000          88,734 
Notes: The sample period is from 1964 to 2007 for major variables, except for OPAQUE, which is measured from 
1990 to 2007 due to the need of statement of cash flows data. CRASHt+1 is an indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 or more standard deviations below the mean 
firm-specific weekly return for fiscal year t + 1, and zero otherwise; NCSKEWt+1, is the negative coefficient of 
skewness of firm-specific weekly returns in fiscal year t + 1; CSCOREt is the conservatism score in fiscal year t; 
DTURNt is the average monthly turnover in fiscal year t minus the average monthly turnover in fiscal year t - 1; 
NCSKEWt is the negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific weekly returns in fiscal year t; SIGMAt is the 
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns in fiscal year t; RETt  is the average firm-specific weekly return in 
fiscal year t times 100; SIZEt  is the log of total assets in fiscal year t; MBt  is the market-to-book ratio in fiscal year t; 
LEVt  is financial leverage in fiscal year t, which is total long-term debt divided by total assets; ROAt+1 is return on 
assets in fiscal year t + 1; OPAQUEt is the Hutton et al. (2009) measure of opaqueness of the firm’s financial reports 
in fiscal year t; Xt is net income divided by lagged market value; Rt is the annual accumulated return in fiscal year t; 
Dt is a dummy equal one if the return (i.e., Rt) in year t is negative, and zero otherwise; TCAt is current accruals in 
year t, scaled by average total assets. Current accruals are defined as (change of current assets - change of cash) - 
(change of current liabilities - change of debt in current liabilities - change of tax payable). ∆REVt is change in 
revenue in year t, scaled by average total assets; GPPEt is gross property, plant, and equipment in year t, scaled by 
average total assets; DCFt is a dummy variable equal to one if the industry median-adjusted operating cash flow in 
year t is negative, and zero otherwise; and CFt is the industry median-adjusted operating cash flow in year t, scaled 
by average total assets. Operating cash flow is defined as income before extraordinary items minus total accruals, 
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where total accruals are defined as current accruals minus depreciation.  
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TABLE 2 
Pearson (below)/Spearman (above) correlation matrix for major variables 
              
Variable  A B C D E F G H I J K L 
CRASHt+1 A  0.43 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.69) (0.00) (0.02) (0.74) (0.08) 
NCSKEWt+1 B 0.49  -0.17 0.05 0.10 -0.10 0.10 0.18 0.13 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) 
CSCOREt C -0.03 -0.14  0.00 -0.19 0.22 -0.22 -0.39 -0.43 0.29 -0.32 0.13 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DTURNt D 0.01 0.04 0.04  0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.07 -0.02 
  (0.16) (0.00) (0.02)  (0.91) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.37) 
NCSKEWt E 0.02 0.09 -0.16 0.01  -0.13 0.14 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.06 -0.05 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIGMAt F -0.02 -0.09 0.19 0.11 -0.12  -1.00 -0.53 0.06 -0.07 -0.12 0.39 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RETt G 0.03 0.09 -0.19 -0.12 0.15 -0.97  0.54 -0.06 0.07 0.12 -0.39 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZEt H 0.00 0.17 -0.27 0.02 0.18 -0.52 0.48  0.00 0.23 -0.01 -0.35 
  (0.86) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.94) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00) 
MBt I 0.02 0.06 -0.18 0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.09 -0.06  -0.08 0.38 0.12 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVt J -0.02 -0.01 0.31 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.19 -0.02  -0.29 -0.16 
  (0.02) (0.13) (0.00) (0.76) (0.54) (0.03) (0.33) (0.00) (0.08)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ROAt+1 K 0.00 0.07 -0.20 0.04 0.05 -0.18 0.19 0.03 0.17 -0.22  -0.04 
  (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
OPAQUEt L 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.33 -0.30 -0.31 0.17 -0.11 -0.09  
  (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Note: This table reports the time-series average of a cross-sectional correlation matrix for the major variables used in our empirical tests. The sample period is from 1964 to 2007 
for the major variables. The variable OPAQUE is measured from 1990 to 2007. All variables are defined in Table 1. P-values in the parentheses are based on Fama-Macbeth t 
statistics.    
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TABLE 3 
Conditional conservatism and future stock price crash risk: Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness regression 
 
Panel A: CRASH as the crash risk measure  
  
 The dependent variable is Xt, which is earnings scaled by market value 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dt -0.007*** -0.017** -0.014 -0.035*** -0.033** -0.040** 
 (-2.87) (-2.16) (-1.57) (-2.70) (-2.51) (-2.52) 
Rt 0.060*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.071***
 (8.44) (4.10) (3.35) (3.16) (3.31) (3.29) 
Dt*Rt 0.048*** 0.031 -0.014 0.099* 0.097* 0.110** 
 (4.91) (0.59) (-0.18) (1.85) (1.81) (1.96) 
CRASHt+1 0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.45) (0.67) (-1.64) (1.46) (1.44) (1.30) 
CRASHt+1*Dt -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
 (-1.09) (-0.37) (-0.83) (-1.59) (-1.57) (-1.05) 
CRASHt+1*Rt -0.009* -0.004 -0.008 0.003 0.003 0.000 
 (-1.66) (-0.84) (-1.25) (0.78) (0.79) (0.04) 
CRASHt+1*Dt*Rt -0.038*** -0.028** -0.033** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045***
 (-2.70) (-1.98) (-2.55) (-2.92) (-2.86) (-3.12) 
DTURNt  0.074*** 0.115*** 0.044** 0.046** 0.122***
  (3.12) (4.31) (2.28) (2.35) (7.10) 
DTURNt*Dt  0.015 0.041 0.024 0.019 0.016 
  (0.43) (1.25) (0.76) (0.62) (0.53) 
DTURNt*Rt  0.054 0.065 0.073** 0.069** 0.034 
  (1.21) (0.99) (2.16) (2.16) (0.73) 
DTURNt*Dt*Rt  -0.229*** -0.161** -0.211*** -0.214*** -0.099 
  (-3.60) (-2.08) (-3.36) (-3.25) (-1.28) 
NCSKEWt  -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-3.33) (-5.31) (-0.45) (-0.52) (-0.48) 
NCSKEWt*Dt  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (1.09) (1.20) (0.94) (1.05) (0.31) 
NCSKEWt*Rt  -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  (-1.45) (-1.23) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-1.36) 
NCSKEWt*Dt*Rt  0.004 -0.005 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.012 
  (0.61) (-0.65) (3.33) (3.32) (1.45) 
SIGMAt  0.200 -0.429* -0.294 -0.328 -0.842***
  (0.69) (-1.71) (-1.12) (-1.23) (-2.84) 
SIGMAt*Dt  0.079 -0.177 0.609** 0.690** 0.684** 
  (0.34) (-0.70) (2.13) (2.37) (2.12) 
SIGMAt*Rt  0.148 -0.052 0.343 0.411 0.224 
  (0.38) (-0.11) (0.84) (1.04) (0.49) 
SIGMAt*Dt*Rt  -0.476 1.266 -0.673 -0.599 0.904 
  (-0.42) (1.03) (-0.54) (-0.51) (0.89) 
RETt  0.062** 0.086** 0.011 0.010 0.022 
  (2.03) (2.45) (0.38) (0.32) (0.58) 
RETt*Dt  0.021 -0.012 0.084* 0.089** 0.086* 
  (0.54) (-0.31) (1.89) (1.98) (1.70) 
RETt*Rt  0.064 0.041 0.072* 0.075* 0.056 
  (1.55) (0.76) (1.81) (1.92) (1.09) 
RETt*Dt*Rt  -0.008 0.157 -0.053 -0.046 0.146 
  (-0.06) (1.18) (-0.37) (-0.33) (1.33) 
SIZEt  -0.017*** -0.000 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001* 
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  (-5.59) (-0.34) (-2.98) (-3.13) (-1.83) 
SIZEt*Dt  0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.003** 
  (1.57) (1.81) (1.36) (1.32) (2.09) 
SIZEt*Rt  -0.006*** -0.006** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003* 
  (-4.19) (-2.32) (-2.58) (-2.78) (-1.69) 
SIZEt*Dt*Rt  0.005 0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.003 
  (1.18) (1.34) (0.07) (0.08) (-0.56) 
MBt  0.000*** -0.000 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.000 
  (3.11) (-0.34) (8.86) (8.79) (0.51) 
MBt*Dt  -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.002** 
  (-1.00) (0.88) (1.52) (1.90) (2.31) 
MBt*Rt  -0.001*** -0.000 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007***
  (-3.15) (-1.02) (-3.83) (-3.69) (-3.40) 
MBt*Dt*Rt  0.001*** 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007* 
  (2.78) (0.89) (-1.12) (-1.11) (-1.82) 
LEVt  -0.023** 0.005 -0.016* -0.016* -0.005 
  (-2.41) (0.59) (-1.77) (-1.72) (-0.59) 
LEVt*Dt  0.016* 0.018* 0.007 0.005 0.005 
  (1.70) (1.82) (0.48) (0.35) (0.39) 
LEVt*Rt  0.086*** 0.095*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.067***
  (6.15) (6.23) (2.85) (2.74) (4.91) 
LEVt*Dt*Rt  0.110*** 0.043 0.088** 0.087** -0.002 
  (3.33) (1.49) (2.28) (2.28) (-0.05) 
OPAQUEt     0.007 0.001 
     (1.10) (0.26) 
OPAQUEt*Dt     -0.020*** -0.021***
     (-2.81) (-2.78) 
OPAQUEt*Rt     -0.022** -0.031** 
     (-2.33) (-2.01) 
OPAQUEt*Dt*Rt     -0.005 0.027 
     (-0.27) (1.26) 
Firm fixed-effects YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Observations 95,938 95,938 95,938 37,194 37,194 37,194 
Number of firms 10,777 10,777 10,777 6,331 6,331 6,331 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.66 11.44 14.97 11.68 11.71 15.85 
       
Panel B: NCSKEW as the crash risk measure 
 
 Dependent variable is Xt, which is earnings scaled by market value 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Dt -0.007*** -0.016** -0.013 -0.036*** -0.034** -0.041***
 (-3.01) (-2.02) (-1.52) (-2.71) (-2.51) (-2.69) 
Rt 0.059*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.071***
 (8.61) (4.04) (3.35) (3.11) (3.26) (3.26) 
Dt*Rt 0.033*** 0.011 -0.041 0.086 0.084 0.088 
 (3.36) (0.22) (-0.57) (1.56) (1.52) (1.55) 
NCSKEWt+1 -0.002 0.000 -0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004***
 (-1.15) (0.36) (-2.22) (2.32) (2.29) (2.79) 
NCSKEWt+1*Dt 0.004* 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (1.94) (1.14) (0.75) (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.56) 
NCSKEWt+1*Rt -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 0.003 0.003 -0.000 
 (-1.04) (-0.62) (-1.45) (0.81) (0.81) (-0.02) 
NCSKEWt+1*Dt*Rt -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.033*** -0.013 -0.013 -0.022***
 (-3.93) (-3.46) (-5.46) (-1.21) (-1.18) (-2.83) 
DTURNt  0.074*** 0.116*** 0.044** 0.045** 0.121***
45 
 
  (3.13) (4.35) (2.27) (2.34) (7.06) 
DTURNt*Dt  0.013 0.038 0.023 0.018 0.015 
  (0.36) (1.17) (0.73) (0.58) (0.50) 
DTURNt*Rt  0.053 0.065 0.073** 0.069** 0.034 
  (1.19) (0.98) (2.13) (2.13) (0.73) 
DTURNt*Dt*Rt  -0.227*** -0.157** -0.211*** -0.214*** -0.099 
  (-3.55) (-2.02) (-3.25) (-3.15) (-1.28) 
NCSKEWt  -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-3.16) (-5.31) (-0.30) (-0.36) (-0.51) 
NCSKEWt*Dt  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (1.00) (1.09) (0.86) (0.97) (0.26) 
NCSKEWt*Rt  -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  (-1.42) (-1.22) (-1.37) (-1.28) (-1.36) 
NCSKEWt*Dt*Rt  0.005 -0.004 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.012 
  (0.62) (-0.53) (3.27) (3.25) (1.42) 
SIGMAt  0.201 -0.422* -0.303 -0.336 -0.851***
  (0.69) (-1.68) (-1.17) (-1.28) (-2.91) 
SIGMAt*Dt  0.065 -0.189 0.601** 0.683** 0.667** 
  (0.28) (-0.74) (2.09) (2.33) (2.08) 
SIGMAt*Rt  0.154 -0.048 0.351 0.420 0.217 
  (0.40) (-0.10) (0.86) (1.06) (0.48) 
SIGMAt*Dt*Rt  -0.454 1.316 -0.686 -0.612 0.902 
  (-0.41) (1.09) (-0.55) (-0.52) (0.90) 
RETt  0.062** 0.087** 0.010 0.009 0.021 
  (2.03) (2.46) (0.35) (0.29) (0.55) 
RETt*Dt  0.019 -0.014 0.083* 0.088* 0.084* 
  (0.50) (-0.35) (1.86) (1.95) (1.65) 
RETt*Rt  0.064 0.042 0.073* 0.076* 0.055 
  (1.57) (0.77) (1.84) (1.95) (1.09) 
RETt*Dt*Rt  -0.007 0.160 -0.056 -0.050 0.143 
  (-0.06) (1.22) (-0.39) (-0.36) (1.34) 
SIZEt  -0.017*** -0.000 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.002** 
  (-5.57) (-0.12) (-3.08) (-3.24) (-2.14) 
SIZEt*Dt  0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002 0.003** 
  (1.46) (1.76) (1.32) (1.28) (2.19) 
SIZEt*Rt  -0.006*** -0.006** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003* 
  (-4.19) (-2.34) (-2.58) (-2.79) (-1.71) 
SIZEt*Dt*Rt  0.007 0.010* 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
  (1.53) (1.72) (0.16) (0.17) (-0.27) 
MBt  0.000*** -0.000 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.000 
  (3.13) (-0.30) (8.75) (8.70) (0.42) 
MBt*Dt  -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.002** 
  (-1.03) (0.84) (1.47) (1.87) (2.31) 
MBt*Rt  -0.001*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007***
  (-3.16) (-1.07) (-3.78) (-3.64) (-3.37) 
MBt*Dt*Rt  0.001*** 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007* 
  (2.80) (0.92) (-1.13) (-1.12) (-1.79) 
LEVt  -0.023** 0.005 -0.016* -0.016* -0.005 
  (-2.40) (0.58) (-1.74) (-1.70) (-0.55) 
LEVt*Dt  0.016* 0.018* 0.007 0.005 0.005 
  (1.70) (1.77) (0.50) (0.38) (0.39) 
LEVt*Rt  0.086*** 0.095*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.067***
  (6.18) (6.28) (2.83) (2.72) (4.95) 
LEVt*Dt*Rt  0.104*** 0.035 0.088** 0.087** -0.006 
  (3.13) (1.22) (2.28) (2.29) (-0.13) 
OPAQUEt     0.007 0.001 
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     (1.09) (0.22) 
OPAQUEt*Dt     -0.020*** -0.021***
     (-2.79) (-2.73) 
OPAQUEt*Rt     -0.022** -0.031** 
     (-2.36) (-2.01) 
OPAQUEt*Dt*Rt     -0.005 0.027 
     (-0.27) (1.26) 
Firm fixed-effects YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Observations 95,938 95,938 95,938 37,194 37,194 37,194 
Number of firms 10,777 10,777 10,777 6,331 6,331 6,331 
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.77 11.52 15.04 11.72 11.75 15.93 
Notes: This table reports the results of a Basu-type (1997) regression analysis on the relation between conditional conservatism 
and future crash risk. For models (1) to (3), the sample period is from 1964 to 2007. For models (4) to (6), the sample period is 
from 1990 to 2007. The dependent variable is earnings in year t, defined as earnings before extraordinary items deflated by the 
lagged market value of equity. All variables are defined in Table 1. The t-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors 
clustered by both firm and year. 
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TABLE 4 
Conditional conservatism and future crash risk: Ball–Shivakumar (2006) piecewise linear accruals regressions 
       
Panel A: Crash risk measured by CRASH 
       
Dependent variable is TCAt, which is total current accruals scaled by average assets 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆REVt 0.106*** 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.101***
 (45.00) (40.77) (36.51) (46.63) (44.98) (29.13) 
GPPEt -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (-1.09) (0.73) (1.48) (0.20) (0.05) (1.37) 
DCFt 0.018*** 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 
 (12.27) (0.61) (-0.80) (-0.74) (-1.13) (-0.33) 
CFt -0.542*** -0.483*** -0.211*** -0.571*** -0.608*** -0.268***
 (-25.04) (-12.23) (-3.42) (-11.02) (-14.40) (-5.58) 
DCFt*CFt 0.176*** -0.321*** -0.643*** -0.134* -0.083 -0.436***
 (6.74) (-4.28) (-7.09) (-1.71) (-1.02) (-4.14) 
CRASHt+1 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.53) (1.52) (0.71) (0.02) (0.02) (-0.29) 
CRASHt+1*DCFt 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.91) (0.96) (1.23) (1.11) (1.09) (1.21) 
CRASHt+1*CFt 0.042*** 0.037** 0.052** 0.033* 0.033* 0.033* 
 (2.62) (2.48) (2.55) (1.91) (1.95) (1.79) 
CRASHt+1*DCFt*CFt -0.076*** -0.061** -0.070** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.103***
 (-2.77) (-2.23) (-2.31) (-2.97) (-3.04) (-2.60) 
DTURNt  0.026*** 0.025* -0.004 -0.006 0.009 
  (2.66) (1.79) (-0.41) (-0.74) (0.79) 
DTURNt *DCFt  0.027 0.033** 0.020 0.025 0.047***
  (1.61) (2.16) (1.02) (1.16) (2.87) 
DTURNt *CFt  0.128* 0.163 0.018 0.037 0.066 
  (1.65) (1.33) (0.20) (0.42) (0.52) 
DTURNt *DCFt*CFt  -0.053 -0.153 -0.156 -0.166 -0.110 
  (-0.42) (-1.05) (-1.15) (-1.23) (-0.82) 
NCSKEWt  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** 
  (-2.90) (-2.82) (-1.02) (-0.78) (-2.44) 
NCSKEWt *DCFt  0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.11) (-0.58) (-1.46) (-1.56) (-0.48) 
NCSKEWt *CFt  0.020** 0.046*** -0.002 -0.004 0.025** 
  (2.14) (4.41) (-0.22) (-0.45) (2.35) 
NCSKEWt *DCFt*CFt  0.008 -0.036** 0.014 0.017 -0.023 
  (0.55) (-2.46) (0.80) (0.95) (-1.12) 
SIGMAt  -0.065 -0.015 0.073 0.093 0.093 
  (-0.47) (-0.12) (0.47) (0.65) (0.72) 
SIGMAt *DCFt  0.436*** 0.624*** 0.466** 0.449** 0.420* 
  (3.41) (4.17) (2.36) (2.48) (1.80) 
SIGMAt *CFt  -0.351 -2.050 1.129 0.996 -1.714 
  (-0.33) (-1.25) (1.11) (1.04) (-1.25) 
SIGMAt *DCFt*CFt  11.061*** 16.319*** 7.563*** 7.866*** 13.312***
  (6.46) (7.50) (4.01) (4.32) (5.60) 
RETt  -0.004 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.019 
  (-0.25) (0.91) (0.18) (0.16) (1.04) 
RETt *DCFt  0.032* 0.062*** 0.051** 0.052** 0.054* 
  (1.76) (2.81) (2.05) (2.20) (1.82) 
RETt *CFt  -0.141 -0.231 0.096 0.099 -0.051 
  (-0.94) (-1.09) (0.66) (0.70) (-0.27) 
RETt *DCFt*CFt  0.932*** 1.365*** 0.639*** 0.650*** 1.089***
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  (4.47) (5.03) (2.78) (2.85) (4.09) 
SIZEt  -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
  (-2.95) (-2.47) (-5.01) (-4.61) (-1.20) 
SIZEt *DCFt  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.19) (-0.08) (-0.17) (-0.05) (-0.27) 
SIZEt *CFt  0.000** 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (2.01) (2.43) (-0.02) (-0.03) (0.54) 
SIZEt *DCFt*CFt  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.13) (-0.98) (0.53) (0.58) (0.11) 
MBt  0.001* 0.001* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004***
  (1.90) (1.92) (10.27) (10.52) (7.06) 
MBt *DCFt  -0.000 -0.000 0.001** 0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.51) (-0.63) (2.07) (1.61) (-0.66) 
MBt *CFt  -0.003 -0.003 0.010*** 0.009** 0.008***
  (-1.13) (-1.22) (2.83) (2.46) (2.59) 
MBt *DCFt*CFt  0.004* 0.005* 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011***
  (1.87) (1.83) (3.75) (4.43) (3.29) 
LEVt  -0.070*** -0.038*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.033***
  (-15.59) (-7.01) (-12.39) (-13.45) (-7.03) 
LEVt *DCFt  -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.032***
  (-11.72) (-9.27) (-6.88) (-6.06) (-5.34) 
LEVt *CFt  -0.399*** -0.461*** -0.234*** -0.215*** -0.202***
  (-10.66) (-6.97) (-5.07) (-4.83) (-3.02) 
LEVt *DCFt*CFt  -0.364*** -0.349*** -0.291*** -0.319*** -0.477***
  (-5.12) (-4.05) (-3.35) (-3.95) (-4.76) 
OPAQUEt     -0.020*** -0.007* 
     (-5.92) (-1.94) 
OPAQUEt *DCFt     0.013** 0.008* 
     (2.57) (1.69) 
OPAQUEt *CFt     0.124*** 0.114***
     (3.76) (3.63) 
OPAQUEt *DCFt*CFt     -0.173** -0.115** 
     (-2.41) (-2.23) 
       
Firm fixed-effects YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Observations 88,734 88,734 88,734 33,179 33,179 33,179 
Adjusted R2 (%) 51.06 53.84 43.76 47.58 47.68 36.60 
       
Panel B: Crash risk measured by NCSKEW 
 
Dependent variable is TCAt, which is total current accruals scaled by average assets 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆REVt 0.105*** 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.101***
 (44.52) (40.04) (36.11) (45.49) (43.95) (28.93) 
GPPEt -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (-1.07) (0.76) (1.42) (0.16) (0.01) (1.30) 
DCFt 0.018*** 0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 
 (11.74) (0.69) (-0.71) (-0.62) (-0.99) (-0.23) 
CFt -0.530*** -0.473*** -0.200*** -0.559*** -0.596*** -0.257***
 (-25.63) (-12.56) (-3.31) (-11.49) (-15.06) (-5.48) 
DCFt*CFt 0.153*** -0.335*** -0.661*** -0.159* -0.109 -0.462***
 (5.49) (-4.42) (-7.30) (-1.76) (-1.16) (-4.12) 
NCSKEWt+1 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (4.87) (2.43) (2.05) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.28) 
NCSKEWt+1*DCFt -0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005***
 (-1.07) (1.55) (1.72) (3.31) (3.23) (3.12) 
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NCSKEWt+1*CFt 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.031***
 (5.49) (4.95) (5.48) (3.32) (3.29) (2.82) 
NCSKEWt+1*DCFt*CFt -0.063*** -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.036***
 (-4.28) (-2.86) (-3.99) (-2.74) (-2.61) (-2.99) 
DTURNt  0.027*** 0.025* -0.002 -0.005 0.010 
  (2.78) (1.79) (-0.29) (-0.62) (0.83) 
DTURNt *DCFt  0.025 0.032** 0.018 0.022 0.045***
  (1.54) (2.06) (0.87) (1.01) (2.70) 
DTURNt *CFt  0.111 0.143 0.004 0.023 0.054 
  (1.49) (1.17) (0.04) (0.26) (0.41) 
DTURNt *DCFt*CFt  -0.040 -0.136 -0.153 -0.164 -0.105 
  (-0.31) (-0.94) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-0.80) 
NCSKEWt  -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** 
  (-2.41) (-2.90) (-0.75) (-0.53) (-2.42) 
NCSKEWt *DCFt  0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.02) (-0.75) (-1.48) (-1.57) (-0.56) 
NCSKEWt *CFt  0.018* 0.042*** -0.003 -0.005 0.024** 
  (1.89) (4.00) (-0.30) (-0.52) (2.16) 
NCSKEWt *DCFt*CFt  0.009 -0.033** 0.016 0.019 -0.021 
  (0.66) (-2.20) (0.92) (1.06) (-1.02) 
SIGMAt  -0.063 -0.008 0.076 0.095 0.096 
  (-0.45) (-0.07) (0.50) (0.67) (0.75) 
SIGMAt *DCFt  0.436*** 0.627*** 0.478** 0.459** 0.433* 
  (3.37) (4.15) (2.28) (2.40) (1.81) 
SIGMAt *CFt  -0.416 -2.107 0.984 0.857 -1.808 
  (-0.41) (-1.30) (1.02) (0.95) (-1.33) 
SIGMAt *DCFt*CFt  11.152*** 16.444*** 7.794*** 8.065*** 13.529***
  (6.61) (7.65) (3.77) (4.02) (5.50) 
RETt  -0.003 0.017 0.004 0.004 0.020 
  (-0.20) (0.97) (0.24) (0.22) (1.07) 
RETt *DCFt  0.031* 0.062*** 0.052** 0.052** 0.056* 
  (1.70) (2.80) (2.00) (2.14) (1.82) 
RETt *CFt  -0.155 -0.245 0.074 0.077 -0.066 
  (-1.06) (-1.15) (0.52) (0.56) (-0.35) 
RETt *DCFt*CFt  0.950*** 1.386*** 0.672*** 0.680*** 1.119***
  (4.57) (5.11) (2.75) (2.80) (4.14) 
SIZEt  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
  (-3.13) (-2.69) (-5.31) (-4.95) (-1.28) 
SIZEt *DCFt  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.16) (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.10) (-0.30) 
SIZEt *CFt  0.000** 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (2.06) (2.48) (0.00) (-0.01) (0.54) 
SIZEt *DCFt*CFt  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.08) (-0.84) (0.54) (0.58) (0.27) 
MBt  0.001* 0.001* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004***
  (1.91) (1.92) (10.35) (10.59) (7.00) 
MBt *DCFt  -0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.51) (-0.61) (1.79) (1.39) (-0.72) 
MBt *CFt  -0.003 -0.003 0.010*** 0.008** 0.008** 
  (-1.14) (-1.22) (2.80) (2.44) (2.53) 
MBt *DCFt*CFt  0.004* 0.005* 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011***
  (1.88) (1.85) (3.83) (4.49) (3.08) 
LEVt  -0.070*** -0.038*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.032***
  (-15.59) (-6.92) (-12.52) (-13.61) (-6.90) 
LEVt *DCFt  -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.032***
  (-11.76) (-9.41) (-6.90) (-6.01) (-5.38) 
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LEVt *CFt  -0.392*** -0.454*** -0.230*** -0.211*** -0.201***
  (-10.74) (-6.98) (-5.11) (-4.88) (-3.01) 
LEVt *DCFt*CFt  -0.372*** -0.357*** -0.292*** -0.318*** -0.477***
  (-5.14) (-4.11) (-3.60) (-4.22) (-4.75) 
OPAQUEt     -0.020*** -0.007* 
     (-5.81) (-1.85) 
OPAQUEt *DCFt     0.013** 0.007 
     (2.54) (1.63) 
OPAQUEt *CFt     0.121*** 0.113***
     (3.74) (3.54) 
OPAQUEt *DCFt*CFt     -0.165** -0.115** 
     (-2.27) (-2.26) 
       
Firm fixed-effects YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Observations 88,734 88,734 88,734 33,179 33,179 33,179 
Adjusted R2 (%) 51.24 53.96 43.95 47.61 47.71 36.63 
Notes: This table reports the Ball–Shivakumar (2006) piecewise linear accruals regression analysis on the relation between 
conservatism and future crash risk. For models (1) to (3), the sample period is from 1964 to 2007. For models (4) to (6), the 
sample period is from 1990 to 2007. In Panel A, future crash risk is proxied by CRASH, which is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 or more standard deviations below the mean firm-
specific weekly return during the measurement window, and zero otherwise. In Panel B, future crash risk is proxied by NCKEW, 
which is the negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific weekly returns in the measurement window. The dependent 
variable is current accruals in year t, scaled by average total assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. The t-values (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and year. 
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TABLE 5 
Conditional conservatism and future crash risk: Khan & Watts (2009) firm-year conservatism measure 
 
Panel A: Logistic regression using CRASHt+1 as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSCOREt  -1.448*** -1.304** -1.274** 
  (-4.21) (-2.32) (-2.26) 
DTURNt 1.085*** 1.101*** 1.033*** 1.060*** 
 (4.25) (4.32) (4.85) (4.98) 
NCSKEWt 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
 (4.30) (3.53) (3.57) (3.54) 
SIGMAt 3.373 2.944 11.311** 10.633** 
 (0.83) (0.76) (2.47) (2.32) 
RETt 0.956* 0.895* 1.903*** 1.865*** 
 (1.86) (1.79) (3.03) (2.97) 
SIZEt -0.011 -0.027** 0.009 0.014 
 (-0.67) (-2.11) (0.52) (0.74) 
MBt 0.001** 0.001* 0.030*** 0.028*** 
 (1.99) (1.91) (3.27) (3.24) 
LEVt -0.221** -0.005 -0.185 -0.187 
 (-2.45) (-0.04) (-1.20) (-1.21) 
ROAt+1 -0.082 -0.117* -0.145* -0.146* 
 (-1.18) (-1.74) (-1.94) (-1.94) 
OPAQUEt    0.195*** 
    (2.62) 
Firm fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Observations 114,548 114,548 46,585 46,585 
Pseudo R2 (%) 3.01 3.11 1.42 1.45 
 
Panel B: Economic significance of the coefficients from the logistic regression Model (4) 
 Unconditional Crash Probability = 12% 
Variables MF(marginal effect) STD STD*MF (STD*MF)/0.12
CSCOREt -0.145 0.085 -1.23% -10.3%
DTURNt 0.134 0.053 0.71% 5.9%
NCSKEWt 0.011 0.686 0.78% 6.5%
SIGMAt 1.350 0.026 3.57% 29.7%
RETt 0.242 0.186 4.50% 37.5%
SIZEt 0.002 2.005 0.42% 3.5%
MBt 0.004 2.064 0.90% 7.5%
LEVt -0.026 0.179 -0.47% -3.9%
ROAt+1 -0.041 0.103 -0.43% -3.5%
OPAQUEt 0.024 0.270 0.64% 5.4%
     
Panel C: OLS regression using NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSCOREt  -0.813*** -0.577*** -0.571*** 
  (-9.41) (-4.34) (-4.26) 
DTURNt 0.503*** 0.522*** 0.428*** 0.435*** 
 (7.76) (7.97) (8.25) (8.28) 
NCSKEWt 0.051*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (9.34) (8.13) (5.18) (5.15) 
SIGMAt 3.346*** 3.292*** 4.351*** 4.191*** 
 (3.31) (3.55) (4.11) (3.93) 
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RETt 0.464*** 0.446*** 0.625*** 0.615*** 
 (4.26) (4.35) (4.90) (4.81) 
SIZEt 0.058*** 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
 (14.72) (15.42) (15.29) (15.99) 
MBt 0.000** 0.000** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 (2.05) (2.16) (7.34) (7.39) 
LEVt -0.130*** 0.012 -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (-6.82) (0.50) (-3.29) (-3.31) 
ROAt+1 0.153*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
 (5.74) (4.99) (3.68) (3.64) 
OPAQUEt    0.045** 
    (2.53) 
Firm fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Observations 114,548 114,548 46,585 46,585 
Adjusted R2 (%) 6.22 6.79 6.09 6.11 
Notes: This table presents regression results on the relation between conservatism and crash risk. Panel A reports the logit 
regression results using CRASH as the dependent variable, and Panel C reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results 
using NCSKEW as the dependent variable. The sample period is from 1964 to 2007 for model (1) and (2) and is 1990 to 2007 for 
model (3) and (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The Z/t-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by 
both firm and year. All estimations contain fiscal year dummies. 
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TABLE 6 
Conditional conservatism and stock price crash risk: The impact of information asymmetry 
 
Panel A: Logistic regression using CRASH as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSCOREt -1.142*** -1.069*** -1.000* -1.230***
 (-3.33) (-3.14) (-1.95) (-3.24) 
R&Dt 0.203***    
 (4.13)    
CSCOREt*R&Dt -0.106***    
 (-3.45)    
HICONt  0.148**   
  (2.18)   
CSCORE*HICONt  -0.109***   
  (-4.01)   
NEGCOVt   -0.137***  
   (-3.89)  
CSCORE*NEGCOVt   -0.005  
   (-0.43)  
IA_FACTORt    0.006 
    (0.14) 
CSCORE*IA_FACTORt    -1.202** 
    (-2.31) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Firm fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Observations 114,548 114,548 89,473 89,473 
Pseudo R2 (%) 3.21 3.21 1.56 1.44 
     
Panel B: OLS regression using NCSKEW as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSCOREt -0.711*** -0.730*** -0.763*** -0.734***
 (-8.30) (-8.78) (-5.30) (-6.81) 
R&Dt 0.075***    
 (5.80)    
CSCOREt*R&Dt -0.294***    
 (-3.77)    
HICONt  0.041***   
  (3.21)   
CSCORE*HICONt  -0.187***   
  (-2.85)   
NEGCOVt   -0.070***  
   (-8.16)  
CSCORE*NEGCOVt   -0.142**  
   (-2.31)  
IA_FACTORt    -0.019* 
    (-1.71) 
CSCORE*IA_FACTORt    -0.376***
    (-3.38) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Firm fixed-effects NO NO NO NO 
Observations 114,548 114,548 89,473 89,473 
Adjusted R2 (%) 6.85 6.81 6.77 6.27 
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Notes: This table presents regression results on the relation between conservatism and crash risk, conditioning on the ex-ante 
information asymmetry proxies. Panel A reports the logit regression results using CRASH as the dependent variable, and Panel B 
reports the OLS regression results using NCSKEW as the dependent variable. The sample period is from 1964 to 2007 for models 
(1) and (2), and from 1982 to 2007 for model (3). The controls variables, as in model (1) of Table 4, are included in all 
regressions but are not reported here to save space. R&Dt is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm reports 
non-zero R&D expenses in fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. HICONt is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm’s Herfindahl index is above the median in fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. NEGCOVt is the log of one plus the number of 
analysts following in fiscal year t, multiplied by minus one. IA_FACTOR is the first principle component of the three measures of 
information asymmetry. See Table 1 for the detailed definitions of all other variables. The logit regression interaction effects and 
their Z-values (in parentheses) are estimated using the procedure of Norton et al. (2004). The Z/t-values (in parentheses) for all 
other coefficients are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and year. All estimations also contain fiscal year dummies. 
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TABLE 7 
Conditional conservatism and stock price crash risk: fixed-effect regressions 
     
Panel A: Conditional logistic regression using CRASHt+1 as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSCOREt  -1.734** -3.298*** -3.279*** 
  (-2.49) (-3.45) (-3.26) 
DTURNt 1.446*** 1.472*** 1.554*** 1.557*** 
 (6.65) (6.88) (5.54) (5.61) 
NCSKEWt -0.203*** -0.211*** -0.253*** -0.252*** 
 (-9.11) (-9.49) (-8.33) (-8.26) 
SIGMAt -6.359 -6.096 -2.324 -2.381 
 (-1.01) (-0.97) (-0.32) (-0.33) 
RETt 0.400 0.392 0.906 0.908 
 (0.54) (0.54) (1.03) (1.04) 
SIZEt 0.263 0.235 0.379 0.379 
 (0.87) (0.82) (0.75) (0.75) 
MBt 0.002 0.002 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 (1.34) (1.39) (3.35) (3.35) 
LEVt -0.437 -0.211 -0.466 -0.469 
 (-1.50) (-0.75) (-1.14) (-1.15) 
ROAt+1 -0.339 -0.346* -0.554*** -0.558* 
 (-1.57) (-1.66) (-1.94) (-1.92) 
OPAQUEt    0.091 
    (0.46) 
Firm fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 86,425 86,425 32,046 32,046 
Pseudo R2 (%) 3.50 3.60 3.50 3.50 
     
Panel B: Firm-fixed effect regression using NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSCOREt  -0.502*** -0.586*** -0.579*** 
  (-6.61) (-2.86) (-2.83) 
DTURNt 0.525*** 0.539*** 0.469*** 0.472*** 
 (9.00) (9.28) (8.67) (8.76) 
NCSKEWt -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.123*** -0.123*** 
 (-10.88) (-11.18) (-9.83) (-9.83) 
SIGMAt 1.025 1.162 1.354 1.315 
 (1.13) (1.31) (1.31) (1.27) 
RETt 0.312*** 0.313*** 0.385*** 0.384*** 
 (3.12) (3.19) (3.07) (3.04) 
SIZEt 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 
 (15.91) (14.83) (10.13) (10.21) 
MBt 0.000** 0.000** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (2.10) (2.13) (9.79) (9.70) 
LEVt -0.259*** -0.185*** -0.313*** -0.313*** 
 (-7.30) (-5.23) (-4.54) (-4.53) 
ROAt+1 0.060** 0.057** -0.035 -0.037 
 (2.08) (1.98) (-0.80) (-0.85) 
OPAQUEt    0.043*** 
    (2.76) 
Firm fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 114,548 114,548 46,585 46,585 
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Number of Firms 12,854 12,854 7,671 7,671 
Adjusted R2 (%) 3.35 3.47 4.43 4.44 
Notes: This table presents the firm-fixed effect regression results on the relation between conservatism and crash risk. Panel A 
reports the conditional logit regression results using CRASH as the dependent variable, and Panel B reports the firm-fixed effect 
regression results using NCSKEW as the dependent variable. The sample period is from 1964 to 2007 for model (1) and (2) and is 
1990 to 2007 for model (3) and (4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The Z/t-values (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors clustered by both firm and year. All estimations contain fiscal year dummies.  
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TABLE 8 
Conditional conservatism and future crash risk: Change analysis 
     
Panel A: OLS regression using  △CRASHt+1 as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
△CSCOREt  -0.232*** -0.543*** -0.541*** 
  (-4.01) (-4.59) (-4.57) 
△DTURNt 0.149*** 0.157*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
 (4.50) (4.69) (4.61) (4.62) 
△NCSKEWt 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 
 (29.15) (28.91) (31.67) (31.70) 
△SIGMAt 4.756*** 4.745*** 4.380*** 4.385*** 
 (12.24) (12.25) (9.32) (9.38) 
△RETt 0.266*** 0.267*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 
 (5.84) (5.82) (3.70) (3.72) 
△SIZEt -0.096*** -0.092*** -0.119*** -0.118*** 
 (-9.98) (-9.60) (-10.30) (-10.37) 
△MBt -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (-9.78) (-9.80) (-7.09) (-7.09) 
△LEVt 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 
 (5.94) (5.97) (4.62) (4.59) 
△ROAt+1 -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.124*** -0.125*** 
 (-7.41) (-7.45) (-5.93) (-5.84) 
△OPAQUEt    0.024 
    (0.78) 
     
Observations 84,754 84,754 34,689 34,689 
Adjusted R2 (%) 9.63 9.67 10.96 10.90 
     
Panel B: OLS regression using  △NCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
△CSCOREt  -0.512*** -1.001*** -1.000*** 
  (-3.65) (-3.95) (-3.96) 
△DTURNt 0.295*** 0.313*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 
 (5.33) (5.58) (5.46) (5.44) 
△NCSKEWt 0.499*** 0.500*** 0.504*** 0.504*** 
 (72.49) (72.68) (63.41) (63.45) 
△SIGMAt 0.642 0.617 1.204 1.207 
 (0.63) (0.60) (1.04) (1.04) 
△RETt -0.055 -0.054 -0.049 -0.049 
 (-0.45) (-0.43) (-0.34) (-0.34) 
△SIZEt -0.289*** -0.280*** -0.319*** -0.318*** 
 (-14.54) (-14.52) (-13.29) (-12.91) 
△MBt -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.050*** 
 (-14.38) (-14.31) (-11.86) (-11.87) 
△LEVt 0.519*** 0.515*** 0.564*** 0.565*** 
 (8.22) (8.28) (7.38) (7.42) 
△ROAt+1 -0.273*** -0.272*** -0.222*** -0.222*** 
 (-6.37) (-6.37) (-6.05) (-6.05) 
△OPAQUEt    0.015 
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    (0.42) 
     
Observations 84,754 84,754 34,689 34,689 
Adjusted R2 (%) 25.49 25.53 25.90 25.85 
Notes: This table presents regression results on the relation between changes in conservatism and changes in future crash risk. 
Panel A reports the OLS regression results using ᇞCRASHt+1 as the dependent variable, and Panel B reports the OLS regression 
results using ᇞNCSKEWt+1 as the dependent variable. The sample period is from 1964 to 2007 for model (1) and (2) and is 1990 
to 2007 for model (3) and (4). ᇞ	is	the	first	difference	operator.	All variables are defined in Table 1. The t-values (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and year. All estimations contain fiscal year dummies. 
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TABLE 9 
Instantaneous crash risk: Cox proportional hazard model 
     
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CSCOREt  -3.301*** -5.606*** -5.632*** 
  (-4.67) (-3.35) (-3.40) 
DTURNt 1.466*** 1.471*** 1.562*** 1.658*** 
 (4.40) (4.43) (3.08) (3.28) 
NCSKEWt 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.057 0.054 
 (2.91) (2.80) (1.20) (1.13) 
SIGMAt 4.611 4.705 4.527 3.641 
 (1.35) (1.37) (0.75) (0.61) 
RETt 1.004** 0.942** 0.600 0.565 
 (2.19) (2.07) (0.79) (0.76) 
SIZEt 0.161*** 0.091** 0.254*** 0.252*** 
 (4.20) (2.42) (2.91) (2.90) 
MBt 0.046*** 0.010 0.020 0.021 
 (3.24) (0.64) (0.78) (0.79) 
LEVt -0.713*** -0.215 -0.897** -0.941** 
 (-3.16) (-0.93) (-2.28) (-2.35) 
ROAt 0.591* 0.560** 0.935** 0.892** 
 (1.78) (2.05) (2.32) (2.25) 
OPAQUEt    0.626*** 
    (3.51) 
Firm fixed-effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 15,745 15,745 7,456 7,456 
Pseudo R2 (%) 2.56 2.80 6.11 6.43 
Notes: This table presents stratified (firm strata) Cox proportional hazard model estimations to predict instantaneous crash risk. 
The sample period is from 1964 to 2007 for models (1) and (2) and is from 1990 to 2007 for models (3) and (4). The dependent 
variable, lnh(t), is the instantaneous risk of crash at time (week) t. For each firm’s crash event, we calculate the crash interval 
(DUR), which is the length of time (in weeks) from the current firm crash event to the next. If no further firm crash event is 
observed by the end of the sample period, the interval is the length of time from the current crash event until the firm’s delisting 
date or the sample period end date (December 31, 2007), whichever is earlier (right censored). A crash event is defined as the 
week when a firm experiences firm-specific weekly return falling 3.2 or more standard deviations below the mean firm-specific 
weekly return for fiscal year t, where fiscal year t is the fiscal year in which the current week is located. The independent 
variables are measured as in fiscal year t and are defined in Table 1. The Z-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors 
clustered by both firm and time. All estimations also contain fiscal year dummies. 
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TABLE 10 
Conditional conservatism and stock price crash risk: Longer forecast windows 
 
Panel A: Logistic regression using CRASH as the dependent variable 
 One-year-ahead window Two-year-ahead window Three-year-ahead window 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
CSCOREt -1.230** -0.886* -1.081** 
 (-2.15) (-1.82) (-2.33) 
DTURNt 1.126*** 0.751*** 0.713*** 
 (4.29) (3.14) (4.34) 
NCSKEWt 0.097*** 0.072*** 0.084*** 
 (3.23) (3.35) (5.29) 
SIGMAt 10.380** 8.099* 9.555*** 
 (1.99) (1.94) (2.95) 
RETt 1.821** 1.424*** 1.467*** 
 (2.55) (2.61) (3.48) 
SIZEt 0.029* 0.023 0.020 
 (1.90) (1.40) (1.24) 
MBt 0.029*** 0.040*** 0.034*** 
 (3.34) (4.36) (3.93) 
LEVt -0.256 -0.120 -0.023 
 (-1.59) (-1.27) (-0.22) 
ROAt+1 -0.114 0.318*** 0.402*** 
 (-1.15) (3.33) (3.80) 
OPAQUEt 0.179** 0.192*** 0.127*** 
 (2.14) (3.58) (2.81) 
    
Firm fixed-effects NO NO NO 
Observations 37,354 37,354 37,354 
Pseudo R2 (%) 1.65 1.91 2.07 
    
Panel B: OLS regression using NCSKEW as the dependent variable 
 One-year-ahead window Two-year-ahead window Three-year-ahead window 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
CSCOREt -0.516*** -0.827*** -1.049*** 
 (-3.25) (-6.40) (-6.85) 
DTURNt 0.463*** 0.565*** 0.475*** 
 (6.37) (4.86) (6.00) 
NCSKEWt 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 
 (4.55) (5.11) (7.07) 
SIGMAt 4.009*** 5.967*** 8.058*** 
 (3.45) (4.28) (6.20) 
RETt 0.608*** 0.813*** 1.014*** 
 (4.43) (4.74) (6.43) 
SIZEt 0.060*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 
 (20.71) (18.74) (15.80) 
MBt 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 
 (8.34) (9.52) (9.58) 
LEVt -0.128*** -0.114** -0.035 
 (-3.48) (-2.55) (-0.64) 
ROAt+1 0.161*** 0.280*** 0.308*** 
 (4.99) (5.13) (5.04) 
OPAQUEt 0.043* 0.081*** 0.087*** 
 (1.91) (3.84) (3.73) 
Firm fixed-effects NO NO NO 
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Observations 37,354 37,354 37,354 
Adjusted R2 (%) 6.87 9.16 9.20 
Notes: This table presents the results of forecasting longer windows of future crash risk. The sample period is from 1990 to 2007. 
All regressions require non-missing three-year window crash risk measures to make the sample size consistent. Panel A reports 
the logit regression results using CRASH as the dependent variable, and Panel B reports the OLS regression results using 
NCSKEW as the dependent variable. All variables are defined in Table 1. The Z/t-values (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors clustered by both firm and year. All estimations also contain fiscal year dummies. 
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TABLE 11 
Time trend analysis 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Logit: CRASH OLS: NCSKEW Logit: CRASH OLS: NCSKEW 
     
TIME 0.015 0.015*** -0.001 0.006*** 
 (1.13) (8.67) (-0.12) (3.69) 
TIME*CSCOREt -0.052*** -0.024*** -0.068*** 0.005** 
 (-2.68) (-7.70) (-5.80) (2.37) 
TIME*DTURNt -0.066** -0.017*** -0.079*** -0.016*** 
 (-2.37) (-3.37) (-2.89) (-3.23) 
TIME*NCSKEWt -0.001 -0.001*** -0.003** -0.001*** 
 (-0.74) (-3.60) (-2.09) (-3.32) 
TIME*SIGMAt 0.889*** 0.106*** 0.805*** 0.082** 
 (4.73) (3.13) (4.84) (2.55) 
TIME*RETt 0.051* 0.009* 0.045* 0.005 
 (1.72) (1.78) (1.69) (1.06) 
TIME*SIZEt 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000** 
 (1.25) (-6.97) (0.08) (-2.41) 
TIME*MBt 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.58) (-1.31) (-0.00) (-1.42) 
TIME*LEVt 0.013* 0.002 0.034*** -0.003*** 
 (1.85) (1.29) (5.81) (-2.72) 
TIME*ROAt+1 0.020** -0.009*** 0.046*** -0.006** 
 (1.99) (-2.69) (4.23) (-2.07) 
CSCOREt 0.009 -0.232*** 0.875** -0.837*** 
 (0.02) (-2.97) (2.51) (-13.75) 
DTURNt 3.376*** 1.098*** 3.679*** 1.099*** 
 (3.32) (6.38) (3.68) (6.46) 
NCSKEWt 0.095* 0.073*** 0.162*** 0.071*** 
 (1.74) (7.48) (3.21) (7.30) 
SIGMAt -23.221*** 0.549 -20.121*** 1.088 
 (-3.66) (0.51) (-3.56) (1.07) 
RETt -0.363 0.256 -0.187 0.363** 
 (-0.36) (1.61) (-0.20) (2.35) 
SIZEt -0.062*** 0.075*** -0.039** 0.058*** 
 (-2.80) (18.27) (-2.06) (15.76) 
MBt -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 (-1.35) (1.37) (0.26) (1.49) 
LEVt -0.360 -0.011 -1.057*** 0.099*** 
 (-1.63) (-0.30) (-5.52) (2.83) 
ROAt+1 -0.773** 0.428*** -1.646*** 0.335*** 
 (-2.22) (3.67) (-4.30) (3.16) 
     
Year Dummies YES YES NO NO 
Observations 114,548 114,548 114,548 114,548 
(Pseudo) R2 (%) 3.26 7.02 2.00 5.72 
Notes: This table presents the regression results on the relation between the trend in conservatism and the trend in crash risk. The 
sample period is from 1964 to 2007. The trend variable TIME is calculated as year minus 1963. All other variables are defined in 
Table 1. The t-values (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Figure 1 Time series distribution of percentage of crashes and conditional conservatism 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The left vertical axis is the percentage of firms that experience a crash in the year and the right vertical axis is the cross-
sectional Basu coefficient in the previous year. The horizontal axis represents year. 
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